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Preface
Most people are familiar with the prediction that a crisis is looming because the number of elderly in the
United States is growing and will soon overwhelm the Social Security and Medicare programs. The fact that
demographic change is only one of many factors that will affect the solvency of these programs is less well
known, however. Also, while federal entitlement programs receive a great deal of attention, other challenges
and opportunities associated with the growth of the elderly population are often ignored.
This report is intended to provide a broad context for policy makers and those who comment on public policy
matters as they consider the implications of an aging society. Data from a variety of sources are used to
examine past and anticipated trends. In presenting the data, the complex interactions that occur among public
programs, private institutions, and individuals are highlighted.
The report begins with an examination of demographic changes that have already occurred and that are likely
to occur. A discussion of the importance of the economy follows. Economic growth has occurred in the past,
despite the aging of society. Assuming economic growth continues, the public debate will essentially be about
how to expend the additional wealth. The capacity of individuals and institutions to adapt is also explored. The
data show that the elderly of today are different from their predecessors. The needs of tomorrow’s elderly and
the contributions they will make to society are likely to be different as well.
The report concludes with a discussion of policy options that can influence the future. Specific proposals to
reform entitlement programs are not examined. Rather, the discussion emphasizes the role that public policy
can play in helping society adapt to demographic change.
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When this Report uses the term elderly population, it means the U.S. population age 65 and older.
Chapter I
T hat our population is aging is no news to most Americans. Media stories about the Census Bureau’sprojection that the elderly population will more than double by the year 2040 abound—as do dire
predictions about the collapse of Medicare and the Social Security system as a consequence.
What the media do not say is that planning for the future on the basis of demographic projections alone is a
fool’s game. Demographic predictions are not necessarily “right.” Nor is demography the only major factor at
work. Many other factors can be equally important. What is needed for wise policy planning is a close look at
the whole range of influences on our future.
This report takes exactly such a look and yields the following major messages.
 Population projections are fraught with uncertainty. The Census Bureau, for example, has made a whole
range of projections about the size of the U.S. population in 2040, the lowest and highest of which differ
by 170 million people.
 Projections are, by definition, based on assumptions. They are conditional statements about what will happen, if
and only if certain other things happen. As more information becomes available, the range of uncertainty narrows.
 The elderly population has already grown dramatically, both in size and as a proportion of the population,
without devastating consequences. There are more than twice as many elderly today as in 1960. But the
nation’s real national income has more than tripled during the same period, making us better off even
though we have aged as a population.
 It is easier to make statements about the future based only on demographic predictions than on all the interactions
among people, communities, and institutions. But, demography is not destiny. Other factors that also alter
the course of the future include economic growth, changes in people’s expectations and behavior, and
changes in public policies.
 Today is different from the past. The elderly of today are healthier, wealthier, and better educated on
average than the elderly of any previous generation. This does not mean that all the elderly are doing well,
however. Substantial inequality exists within the elderly population, with some groups among the elderly
particularly vulnerable. If these disparities continue—or, worse still, grow—the future well-being of
America’s elderly population generally could be threatened.
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INTRODUCTION
THE FUTURE IS MORE UNCERTAIN THAN COMMONLY ACKNOWLEDGED
Population projections are uncertain for all age groups. The Census Bureau projects that by 2040, the U.S.
population could range anywhere from 288 million to 458 million. The number of people under age 65 in the
year 2040 could range, similarly, anywhere from 229 million to 366 million. The wide range in population
projections reflects differences in the assumptions made about three factors: mortality, fertility, and
immigration. Projections are generally based on past trends, but a number of uncertainties are associated with
each of these factors that make past trends a risky basis on which to project the future. Mortality trends, for
example, depend on the outlook for diseases such as AIDS, which were unknown three decades ago and have
had a profound effect on the population in a relatively short time. Immigration policy changes could have
equally unanticipated effects on the population in the future.
Changes in the U.S. economy and society are also hard to foresee. Projections for today made in 1960, for
example, probably would have not anticipated how many mothers of young children would remain in the labor
force. They would also probably have been based upon assumptions about private pensions and health care
plans that are no longer the norm. In 1960, for example, a pension plan was a defined benefit plan, not a
defined contribution savings plan like a 401(k)-type plan. In 1960, virtually all health insurance coverage was
first-dollar indemnity, managed care was virtually unknown, and Medicare did not exist. In 1960, personal
computers, fax machines, and cellular telephones were yet to be invented. And health clubs were the domain of
boxers, not white collar workers.
All these factors should make policy makers wary of enacting major changes based solely on anxiety about the
increases in the number of elderly people.
THE ELDERLY POPULATION HAS ALREADY GROWN IN SIZE AND AS A PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL,
WITHOUT DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES
Since 1900 the number of elderly has doubled three times. Even since 1960 it has increased by more than 100
percent while the overall population has grown only 50 percent. But during the same time the nation’s income
(as measured by Gross Domestic Product) has increased over 220 percent.
Given that society has been aging for a very long time, demographic projections of an increasing elderly
population were no secret to the policy makers who advocated and passed Medicare, Medicaid, the Older
Americans Act, the Employee Retirement Security Act, or the expansions in Social Security. Yet since the 1960s,
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1 Peterson, P. Roanoke Times and World News, June 28, 1983.
2 National Commission on Retirement Policy (January 1998). Can America Afford to Retire? The Retirement Security Challenge Facing You and the Nation. Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
3 Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform. (1995). Final Report to the President. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
the country has been able to establish, sustain, and benefit from all these programs. It is also true that dire
predictions have been made in the past. For example, in the early 1980’s it was common to presume that
“Medicare is going to crash in the latter half of the ‘80s.”1 Ten years later, with relatively minor revisions, Medicare
continues to provide health care coverage for the elderly.
ECONOMIC GROWTH MATTERS
Economic growth has made the nation more prosperous today than ever before and has enabled many to enjoy
a higher standard of living than would have been possible a generation earlier. While income and wealth are not
equally distributed among the population, most income groups have improved their lot over the years.
In contemplating the future, however, many wonder if the country will be able to support an aging society.
Much of the concern relates to anxiety about federal entitlement program spending. The Commission on
Retirement Policy predicts “rapid increases in entitlement spending…spiraling deficits…huge revenue needs…a
burden on future generations.”2 The Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform warns that “… the
projected imbalance between spending and revenues—particularly with regard to health care and retirement
entitlement programs—will, together with interest on the Federal debt, undermine America’s capacity to make
appropriate investments in the well being of our citizens and undertake other essential government functions,
such as national defense.”3
There is reason to be concerned about growth in expenditures, but there is more reason to be concerned about
economic growth. With little economic growth society faces a significant challenge; with sufficient economic
growth the challenge is considerably smaller. Small differences in economic growth today can make big differences
later. GDP in 2030 will be nearly twice as large if average annual growth rates is three percent rather than one
percent, for example. If the economy grows on average 2.8 percent per year between now and 2030, then projected
government expenditures will be the same proportion of the economy in 2030 as today, even assuming substantial
entitlement spending growth.
It would be foolish to assume society will simply grow its way out of the difficult choices that the aging of the
population will bring. It would be equally foolish to assume that the future will be completely dismal if there is no
radical restructuring of government programs.
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THE ELDERLY OF TOMORROW WILL BE DIFFERENT
Today’s elderly are living in a manner that few could imagine a generation ago. They are better educated, healthier,
and wealthier than the previous generation of elderly Americans. Future elderly are likely to be even better off
and therefore they too will redefine “retirement” and “old age.” The way people change will influence service
and product markets, and public policy. The demonstrated capacity of all groups in society to adapt should be
an important consideration for decision makers as they contemplate the future effects of current policies.
THE FUTURE ELDERLY WILL COVER A WIDE SPAN OF INCOME AND HEALTH NEEDS
Improvements for the elderly as a group should not blind us to the fact that certain segments of the elderly
population remain very vulnerable. Older single women, for example, have particularly low incomes on average.
There is also a substantial gap in educational attainment among baby-boomers. Since people with more
education tend to have higher incomes and better health, this educational disparity virtually guarantees that
tomorrow’s elderly will be a diverse group. Current financial disparities can be expected to persist or grow. And
large health and long-term care expenses can substantially drain the resources even of those elderly who
previously, were relatively secure financially. Social insurance—in the form of Social Security, Disability
Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, and Medicare—is designed to serve as a basis for the economic security
of all workers and their dependents. Just as these programs have contributed to improvements for the elderly in
the past, they will be an important source of support in the future, other things equal.
POLICY MATTERS
Population growth and change will affect society, but so will the policy choices we make. Policies that promote
economic growth, redistribute income, influence individual behaviors, or even change the demographic profile
of the population will all have impacts on the future.
Much of the concern over the anticipated growth in the elderly population is related to anxiety about federal
entitlement program spending. Federal budget issues may be significant, but the federal budget is just one facet
of the economy. Policy makers must not only evaluate the costs of programs like Medicare and Social Security,
they must also consider the benefits these programs provide and what our world would be like without them.
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With reasonable economic growth, projected government spending will not be substantially larger as a percent of
national income than it is today. With less economic growth, tough choices—related to cutting benefits or raising
taxes—will have to be made. But since there will certainly be some positive growth, the debate about future
government spending comes down primarily to a debate on how to distribute the additional wealth in the economy.
Currently, much of the public discussion about an aging society involves how to finance Social Security and
Medicare. Resolving this question will alter how much of the elderly’s economic security in the future is
financed publicly, but will do little to resolve all the questions raised by an aging society. Reducing the share of
public support leaves individuals and their families responsible for a larger share of the costs but does not
eliminate those costs. Families and local communities will still face a wide array of issues related to education,
housing, social services, and transportation that will not be answered by entitlement reforms.
THE FUTURE WILL BRING CHALLENGES THAT REQUIRE CAREFUL ATTENTION NOW
Issues related to the aging of our society pale in comparison with the social, political, military and economic
challenges our society has already faced over the past century. With little planning, society faced the birth of the
baby-boom and has adjusted well to the consequences of large numbers of people moving through the schools,
the labor force, and the housing, product, and financial markets.
Society now faces the movement of the baby-boom generation out of the labor force and into the realm of
health care, long-term care, and claims on retirement  income. Society can and will adjust as it has done before.
But the adjustment will be easier if the challenges are addressed in a rational manner today. Although no one
knows exactly what the future holds, undoubtedly difficult choices will be made—by individuals, families,
private institutions, and policy makers. Recognizing the complexity of these issues allows such choices to be
better evaluated before decisions are made. As policy makers decide on policies today, they must recognize that
those policies will have to change as everything else changes, and build in enough flexibility to allow such
changes to be made as the future becomes clearer.
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Chapter IITHE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERATIVE
The oldest baby-boomers are now in their early fifties, representing the leading edge of an anticipated tidalwave of future seniors. Conventional wisdom has it that, as baby-boomers age, the major increase in both
the number and proportion of elderly will cause society to shift from one that promotes growth and innovation
to one that is preoccupied with caring for dependent people—and that unprecedented numbers of Social
Security and Medicare beneficiaries will overwhelm not only the retirement and health systems, but the federal
budget as a whole. This sense of crisis may stem primarily from the notion that older people will account for a
larger portion of the population. But that cannot be the whole reason for the anxiety, because the elderly
population has already grown dramatically without devastating consequences.
This chapter takes a close look at the numbers related to the aging of the U.S. population. It shows that:
 Population projections are by no means certain. They change as the assumptions on which they are based
change.
 The “baby-boom” was not as large as is generally thought. Only the additional babies born because of the
higher birth rate should be counted.
 The number of elderly people relative to people of working age in the population is predicted to be more
than twice as large in 2040 as in 1960. But the number of total dependents—children and the elderly—
relative to people of working age is predicted to be lower in 2040 than in 1960.
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1 U.S. Census Bureau. (September 1975). Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. 93rd Congress, 1st Session. House Document No. 93-78 (Part 1).
2 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (October 1998). National Income Product Accounts. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
THE ELDERLY POPULATION HAS BEEN GROWING FOR A LONG TIME
The elderly population has been
growing rapidly throughout the
twentieth century. Since 1960, it
has grown 107 percent, while the
total population has grown only
50 percent.1 But from 1960 to
1997 the nation’s income, adjusted
for inflation, increased 221
percent.2 Thus, despite the growth
in the proportion of elderly,
overall standards of living have
improved.
LIFE EXPECTANCY HAS INCREASED
Prior to the twentieth century,
survival to a very old age meant
living to age 50 or 60. Now it means
living beyond age 95. Most people
equate the aging of our society with
increasing life expectancy among
the elderly. Since 1940 life
expectancy at age 65 has indeed
increased—3.6 years for men and
5.8 years for women. But the elderly
is not the only group living longer.
There have been even more
dramatic increases in life expectancy
at birth—due in great part to
reductions in infant mortality. Since
1940 life expectancy at birth has
increased 11.2 years for men and
13.6 years for women.
What will life expectancy be in the
twenty-first century? Experts do not
8 NATIONAL ACADEMY ON AN AGING SOCIETY
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
N
U
M
BE
R 
IN
 T
H
O
U
SA
N
D
S
YEAR
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
3,080 3,949
4,933
6,634
9,019
12,269
16,560
19,980
25,550
31,079
34,286
Figure 2-1: Growth in the Number of Elderly
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 65+ in the United States. P23–190, Table 2-1, 1996.
Note: 1998 is a projection from U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, 
Sex and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, Table 2, 1996.
______________________
3 Friedland, R. (October 1998). Life Expectancy in the Future: A Summary of a Discussion among Experts. North American Actuarial Journal, 2(4), 1-14.
agree on the scale of the increase,
though they do agree on the
direction. Actuaries, biologists,
biodemographers, demographers,
and economists approach the
measurement question differently
and, thus, draw different
conclusions—both about what is 
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Figure 2-3: Number of Live Births
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of  the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Series B-14, 1975.
National Center for Health Statistics, Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 45, No. 11(S).
72.3 Million
Baby-Boom
driving death rate changes and about  how much life expectancy will
increase in the future. What they do agree on is that longevity will
almost certainly increase, some taking Japan as a leading indicator. In
Japan, at the beginning of the century, life expectancy was much lower
than in North America and Europe. Today, life expectancy in Japan at
birth is 82 years, longer than in all other developed nations—suggesting
that life expectancy at birth in the United States could increase over the
next century by another ten years.3 
IN THE PAST 18 YEARS ALMOST AS MANY BABIES HAVE BEEN BORN AS DURING THE 18 YEARS OF THE
BABY-BOOM
All this attention to the growth of
the elderly population overlooks
the fact that there will be growth
in the non-elderly population as
well. Baby-boomers had fewer
children than their parents, but
there are more parents now than
ever. Hence, in the past 18 years,
there have been almost as many
babies born (72 million) as during
the 18 years of the baby-boom (76
million).
HOW BIG WAS THE BABY-BOOM?
Many commentators talk about the 76 million baby-boomers as if no children would have been born in the
absence of the baby-boomers. If fertility rates had remained at pre-World War II rates, there would still have been
64 million children born from 1946 to 1964. The real “baby-boomers” are the 12.3 million additional children
born in these years.
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Figure 2-4: Population Pyramids, 1950 to 2030
Source: 1950 data from U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, 
Series A-119-134, 1975.
1998 and 2030 data from U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, Sex, and 
Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050.  Table 2, 1996.
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THE POPULATION PROFILE WILL CHANGE
As the children of baby-boomers
have children, the age pyramid will
fill out. In 1950, each new
generation was larger than the one
that preceded it, except for those
born in the depression. By 1998,
the population distribution has
already become less triangular,
reflecting falling fertility rates after
the baby-boom and during the
1970s. By 2030, when the baby-
boom generation reaches age 65
and beyond, the triangle is
expected to become a rectangle—
indicating that the population will
be more evenly distributed across
generations than it has ever been.
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WHO ARE THE “DEPENDENTS” IN A SOCIETY?
Dependency ratios compare some
measure of the non-working age
population (“dependents”) with the
population that is of working age, as a
quick gauge of the degree to which
economic resources are likely to be
diverted from those who are
economically active to those who 
are not.
The number of Social Security and
Medicare beneficiaries relative to the
number of workers paying payroll
taxes is the dependency ratio that most
affects the financing of Social Security
and Medicare. Hence, the dependency
ratio that is examined most often is
the number of elderly relative to the
adult-age population. In 1960 there
were 17.3 elderly people for every 100
people aged 20 to 64. By 1995, this
number  had increased to 21.4, and by
2040 it is projected to reach 36.9. In
the context of the broader society,
however, the growing ratio of elderly
to people of working age has relatively
little meaning by itself. The ratio is
relevant to discussions about financing
public programs, particularly when
financing is primarily from current
workers to current beneficiaries.
Dependency ratios provide only a
limited view of the implications of an
aging society. Not all people of working
age are working, and not all people aged
65 and older have stopped working.
And while work is an important source
of payroll taxes, it is not the only activity
that contributes to the economy.
Although many older people may not
be working, many are still paying taxes.
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Figure 2-5: Past and Projected Elderly per 100 Workers
        Age 20 to 64
Source: 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds, Table II.H1.
Note: Intermediate assumptions.
Many people not working are consuming goods and services they
finance out of their own savings, thus helping provide workers with
the opportunity to work. Many non-workers will also be investors
and lenders of financial capital, and many will be volunteers who
help their families or communities, providing services that help
workers be more productive or services that would have been
financed by workers if there were no volunteers.
Another important consideration is that the increasing proportion of
people aged 65 and older to the working-age population is neither
new nor unexpected. In 1945, in the early days of the Social Security
program, there were 41.9 contributing workers for every beneficiary.
As the program and the elderly population grew, there was a huge
decrease in the number of workers per beneficiary. By 1950, as a
result, there were just 16.5 contributing workers for every beneficiary.
The current ratio is 3.4 contributing workers for each beneficiary. By
2040, under the intermediate projections of the Social Security
Trustees, the ratio of beneficiaries to workers is projected to decline to
2 contributing workers for every beneficiary. Over the years the
program matured and was sustained in part by economic growth, and
in part by incremental changes to the program. Economic growth and
incremental program changes are likely to continue to play a part in
sustaining the program. And, if the “pay-as-you-go” financing
mechanism for Social Security and Medicare is altered, dependency
ratios will have even less relevance in the future than they do today.
______________________
4 Treas, J. (1995). Older Americans in the 1990s and Beyond. Population Bulletin, 5(2).
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WHAT IF CHILDREN ARE INCLUDED IN THE DEPENDENCY COUNT?
Currently there are fewer
children and elderly relative to
people of working age than ever
before. Although the ratio of
total “dependents” to people of
working age is projected to
increase between now and 2040,
it is not expected to grow as
large as it was in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s. There were 90
people under age 20 or over age
65 for every 100 people aged 20
to 64 back in 1960.
There will be 65.2 “dependents”
per 100 working-age people in
2010, and 80 by 2040.
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Figure 2-6: Past and Projected Number of Dependents
        per 100 Workers Age 20 to 64
Source: 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds, Table II.H1.
POPULATION PROJECTIONS ARE UNCERTAIN FOR ALL AGE GROUPS
By 2040, the Census Bureau projects
that the number of people could range
from 288 million to 458 million. The
number of people under age 65 in the
year 2040 could range from 229 million
to 366 million.
Changes in the age distribution of the
population in the future will be
accompanied by changes in other
demographic characteristics as well.
Older women continue to outnumber
older men. As a result, women often find
themselves alone with few financial
resources other than, perhaps, a home. In
recent years, however, women have not
seen the significant decline in deaths
from heart disease that have benefited
men.4 If trends such as these continue,
the gap in longevity between men 
and women may shrink, and with it some of the problems that
older women face alone today.
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Figure 2-7: Population by Age:  Alternative Census 
        Bureau Projections
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population of the U.S. by Age, Race, Sex, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, 
P25–1130, Table F, 1996.
200
0
250
300
350
400
450
500
    
Total Population 
(High)
Total Population (Low)
Total Non-Elderly Population (Low)
Total Non-Elderly 
Population (High)
DEMOGRAPHY IS NOT DESTINY The Demographic Imperative 13
THE USE OF DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS MAKE POPULATION PROJECTIONS UNCERTAIN
The wide range in population projections reflects differences in the assumptions made about three factors:
mortality, fertility, and immigration. Uncertainties are associated with each of these factors. For example, while
there have been improvements in life expectancy, emerging diseases pose new threats. Diseases such as AIDS,
which were unknown three decades ago, have had a profound effect on the population in a relatively short time.
Their future effect is uncertain. Known diseases may also pose threats if they become resistant to established
medications or treatments. And the impact of a new pandemic, such as a new strain of flu, could be significant.
Another important consideration related to predicting life expectancy is possible changes in the life span itself.
Advances in biomedical and genetic engineering may even alter the maximum time people are biologically able to
live if nothing kills them except
the aging process.
The aging of society stems from
two trends: improvements in life
expectancy (especially among
infants) and declines in fertility.1
Even if there were no
improvements in life expectancy,
the decline in fertility alone
would lead to the aging of the
population.2 Fertility rates are
sensitive to a multitude of
factors—including particular
events, social attitudes, family
structure, women’s workforce
participation and earnings, and
overall economic conditions.
Technological changes—such as
the availability of different types of birth-control methods—also affect fertility. Population projections are based
on past fertility rates. Thus, they cannot reflect the impact of changes in individual expectations, economic
circumstances, and the broader society. For example, actual fertility rates between 1980 and 1995 fluctuated more
than predicted—a fluctuation that probably played a large role in the revised projections for future years.
1 Friedland, R. (October 1998). Life expectancy in the future: A Summary of a Discussion among Experts. North American Actuarial Journal, 22(4), 1-14.
2 Binstock, R. & George, L. (1990). Handbook of aging and the social sciences. (3rd ed.) San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
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Figure 2-8:  Projections Change over Time
Source: 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds.
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Figure 2-9: Past and Projected Population Age 65 
        and Older
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, Sex, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, P25–1130, Table F, 1996. U.S. Census Bureau, 65+ in the United States. 
P23–190, Table 2-1, 1996.
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THE NUMBER OF FUTURE ELDERLY CANNOT BE KNOWN WITH CERTAINTY
Depending on the assumptions
made concerning future mortality
and immigration rates, the Census
Bureau estimates that the number
of elderly in 2040 may be 59
million or 92 million—a
difference of 33 million people.
PROJECTIONS FOR THE OLDEST ELDERLY ALSO VARY SUBSTANTIALLY
Population projections for the
oldest elderly (age 85 or more)
vary even more dramatically. By
2040 there may be anywhere from
8.3 million to 20.9 million people
age 85 or older—a difference of
12.6 million.
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Figure 2-10: Past and Projected Population Age 85 and Older
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 65+ in the United States. P23–190, Table 2-1, 1996. U.S. Census Bureau, 
Population of the U.S. by Age, Race, Sex, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, P25–1130, Table F, 1996.
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THERE IS UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE FUTURE NUMBERS OF BOTH ELDERLY AND NON-ELDERLY
PEOPLE OF WORKING AGE
Given the uncertainty of population
projections generally, it is not
surprising that projections of the
elderly dependency ratio (the ratio of
the elderly population to the
working age population) vary. Most
social insurance programs, like Social
Security, are financed primarily by a
fixed tax rate on current workers. As
a result, the financial status of social
insurance programs for the elderly is
determined in large part by the
elderly dependency ratio. Thus,
variations in the dependency ratio
help explain why the Social Security
Trustees project that the OASDI
Trust Funds could either be depleted
over the next 25 years or remain
solvent for another 75 years.
THE ELDERLY POPULATION IS PROJECTED TO GROW OLDER
Currently, the “oldest” elderly
(those 80 years of age and over)
constitute almost one quarter—
24 percent—of the elderly
population. By 2050 the Census
Bureau’s intermediate
projections indicate that this
share is expected to rise to
about 38 percent. From 1995 to
2050, however, while the elderly
population is projected to more
than double, the proportion age
80 and older will increase 225
percent and the proportion age
65 to 79 to 90 percent.
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Figure 2-11: Number of Elderly per 100 Workers
          Age 20 to 64: Three Projections
Source: 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and 
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table II.H1.
Note: These three projections are based on values relating to future trends in certain key factors that affect 
the balance in the Social Security Trust Funds. The "low cost" set assumes relatively rapid economic growth,
low inflation, and favorable demographic conditions. The "intermediate" set of assumptions represents the 
Social Security Trustees' "best estimates" of likely future economic and demographic conditions. The "high cost" 
set assumes slow economic growth, more rapid inflation, and financially disadvantageous demographic conditions.
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THE POPULATION MAY BE MORE RACIALLY AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE
Minority populations will be
increasing proportions of the
elderly and the non-elderly
populations. African-American,
Asian, and Hispanic
populations are all increasing
more rapidly than the non-
Hispanic white population
because of both higher birth
rates and higher immigration
rates. Non-Hispanic whites
made up 85 percent of the
elderly population in 1995, a
share that is projected to slip to
67 percent by 2050. Non-
Hispanic whites made up nearly
three-quarters (72 percent) of
the non-elderly population in
1995, a share that is projected to
slip to just under half (49
percent) in 2050. Over the same
period, the Hispanic proportion
of the elderly population is
expected to triple (from 5
percent to 16 percent). And the
Hispanic proportion of the
non-elderly population is
projected to more than double
over the next 55 years (from 11
percent to 24 percent).
Since racial gaps in life
expectancy have remained
constant over the past several
decades—with life expectancy
for African-Americans six to
eight years lower than for
whites—improvements in life
expectancy are not expected to
contribute significantly to
racial and ethnic diversity
among the elderly.
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WHAT’S THE
DIFFERENCE?
Population projections typically
include a high, middle, and low
estimate. The figure compares the
middle estimates for the year 2030
from three sources. Even this
comparison, selected to minimize
the variation, shows a difference
of about 5 million people between
the highest middle series estimate
(from the Census Bureau) and the
lowest (from The Urban
Institute.) Social Security
Administration actuaries estimate
that under current law, the
average annual Social Security
benefit in 2030 will range from
$11,030 to $24,018 in 1998 dollars
(depending on whether the beneficiary had been a low-wage or a high-wage worker). If we assume the same
relative income distribution of lifetime wages among future retirees as among current workers, a difference of
plus or minus 5 million elderly implies a difference of about $76 billion dollars in potential Social Security
benefits (in 1998 dollars).1
1 Calculations assume three percent inflation.
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Figure 2-14:  The Elderly Population in 2030:  
Three Projections
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the U.S. by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 
1995 to 2050, P25–1130, Table F. 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds.  
Zedlewski, S. & McBride, T., “The Changing Profile of the Elderly: Effects on the Future 
Long-Term Care Needs and Financing,” The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1992. 
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Chapter III
Overall economic well-being in the United States is greater today than ever before. In contemplating thefuture, however, many people wonder if the country will be able to support an aging society. Much of
this concern is related to anxiety about federal entitlement program spending. More elderly people will result in
more claims against Social Security and Medicare. Without dramatic changes in the way long-term care is
financed, more elderly are also likely to mean more claims on Medicaid for long-term care. Medicaid
expenditures for elderly with few resources will also grow. The rising number of beneficiaries means more
expenditures in absolute terms. But how burdensome the increased expenditures may be in the future depends
on how the costs stack up in the context of the broader economy.
This chapter examines the role economic growth could play in the future. Among the findings:
 The U.S. economy has grown throughout the country’s history, whatever the rate of population growth.
 Younger people in the future are likely to be wealthier than younger people of today, even though there are
likely to be some transfers from younger people to older people.
 Most of the discussion about future government spending is ultimately about how to distribute the
additional wealth of the nation.
 The future financing of federal entitlement programs poses a huge challenge if there is little or no
economic growth. But if real economic growth averages 2.8 percent a year, projected government
expenditures in 2030 will be the same proportion of GDP as today and the fiscal challenges of projected
demographic change will be manageable.
 Small differences in economic growth now make big differences later on. GDP in 2030 will be nearly twice
as large, for example, if annual growth rates average three percent rather than one percent.
ECONOMIC GROWTH MATTERS
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ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS ENABLED MANY PEOPLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING THAN
WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE A GENERATION EARLIER
From 1940 to 1958 the size of the U.S.
economy (in real terms) doubled. It
doubled again in the next 20 years.
Since 1978, the economy has increased
over 60 percent, not as fast as after
World War II, but fast enough to
increase living standards substantially.
Advances in technology have done a
lot to make this happen by
significantly changing the quality of
life. Many of today’s “necessities”—
personal computers, facsimile
machines, cellular telephones—were
either luxuries or fantasies of science
fiction just a few years ago. Even the
rich could not get fresh fruits and
vegetables year-round until relatively
recently. And many older people can
vividly remember when telephones
were rare, when televisions did not
exist, and when indoor plumbing was
the exception in much of the country.
Along with general improvements in
standards of living have come
improvements in health care standards.
Advances in medicine have made it
possible to treat diseases—such as high
blood pressure, high cholesterol,
pneumonia—for which there were no
cures 25 to 50 years ago. Prescription
drugs and new noninvasive surgeries
are now used to treat conditions that
would have required major surgery in
years past. Advances in preventive care
have made it possible to diagnose and
treat conditions earlier. And, changes
in the workplace have helped reduce
the rate of death from accidents,
although not accident rates themselves.
19
29
19
34
19
39
19
44
19
49
19
54
19
59
19
64
19
69
19
74
19
79
19
84
19
89
BI
LL
IO
N
S 
O
F 
19
92
 D
O
LL
A
RS
YEAR
Figure 3-1: Real GDP from 1929 to 1997
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Product Accounts, October 1998.
Note: Shaded areas represent recessionary periods.
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HISTORICALLY, REAL RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
HAVE VARIED
The 1990s, which began with a relatively severe recession, are likely to
be the decade with the lowest rate of real economic growth since 1929.
Except for the 1990s and the 1930s, average annual real economic
growth in this country has exceeded three percent throughout the
twentieth century. Average annual rates of real economic growth
exceeded five percent in the 1940s and four percent in the 1960s. No
one knows what the magnitude of economic growth will be over the
next three decades.
Table 3-1: Real Economic Growth Rates by Decade
Decade Real Growth Rate
1930s 2.1%
1940s 5.0%
1950s 3.5%
1960s 4.5%
1970s 3.4%
1980s 3.0%
1990-1997 1.9%
Source: Calculations based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (website).
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1 U.S. Census Bureau. (September 1975). Historical statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. 93rd Congress, 1st Session. House Document No. 93-78 (Part 1).
2 Blinder, A. (1997). The Speed Limit: Fact and Fancy in the Growth Debate. The American Prospect, 34 (September/October), 57–62.
ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS OCCURRED DESPITE POPULATION GROWTH
From 1960 to 1997, the
population of the United States
grew about 50 percent, the
number of elderly doubled and
the number of workers nearly
doubled—increasing by 97
percent from 65.8 to 129.6
million.1 The country’s ability to
absorb a doubling of the elderly
population since 1960 and still
raise its living standards is related
in good part to general economic
growth since then. Real per capita
GDP has increased steadily
between 1950 and 1997—from
$10,600 to $27,200.
SMALL DIFFERENCES IN GROWTH MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE
How fast will the U.S. economy
grow between now and 2050?
Experts do not agree.2 The Clinton
Administration’s Council of
Economic Advisors assumes about
2.3 percent a year on average. The
Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) assumes 1.5 percent a year.
Even with average economic
growth of only 1 percent a year,
real GDP in 2030 will be over $10
trillion (in 1992 dollars) or
$28,827 per person. Economic
growth of 3 percent a year would
result in a GDP almost twice as
large, $19.3 trillion (in 1992
dollars) or $55,635 per person.
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Figure 3-2: GDP Per Capita 
Source: www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt, October 1998. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income Product Accounts, October 1998.
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Figure 3-3:  Past and Projected Real GDP 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Product Accounts, October 1998 and NAAS calculations.
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WITH LITTLE ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOCIETY FACES A HUGE CHALLENGE; HIGHER GROWTH REDUCES
THE CHALLENGE
Little or no economic growth will
confront society with a huge
challenge in financing federal
entitlement programs—and the
difficult choice of either cutting
promised benefits or raising tax
rates in the face of slowing or even
declining standards of living. With
higher economic growth, however,
incomes and tax revenues at 
DESPITE POPULATION GROWTH, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES HAVE NOT INCREASED FASTER THAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH
With the exception of World War
II and the Korean War, GDP has
grown faster than government
spending throughout the
twentieth century. As a result,
federal government expenditures
as a percentage of GDP have either
declined or remained fairly
constant since 1950. Federal
government expenditures have
declined as a percentage of GDP
since 1990, although state and
local government expenditures as
a percentage of GDP have
increased.
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Figure 3-4: Federal, State, and Local Government 
        Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross 
                   Domestic Product 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, August 1997.
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current tax rates will rise, making the fiscal challenge associated with
demographic changes more manageable. With modest economic
growth, future choices will be about distributing resources from a larger
national income. A quarter of a pie can be relatively large or small
depending on the size of the pie. If our economic pie is bigger, then
what was once financed from 10 percent of the pie may only need 5
percent of the pie. It would be foolish to assume that society can simply
grow its way out of any difficult choices. But it would be equally foolish
to assume that radical restructuring of government programs is the 
only solution.
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CHANGES IN SPENDING AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT CAN INFLUENCE SPENDING AT
ANOTHER
Spending decisions at one
level of government are
likely to affect the
spending at another.
Decisions about federal
financing of education,
health care, and welfare, in
particular, have a direct
impact on state and local
government spending in
the same areas. Although
federal spending on
education has not
declined, for example, the
federal share of education
financing has generally
declined. Since the
number of students in elementary education has continued to increase, this has generally meant that education
funding has been financed increasingly by state and local governments.
Starting in about 1963 and continuing through the mid-1970s, state and local government spending increased
faster than the growth in federal spending, despite the federal “war on poverty” and the Vietnam War. To some
extent these changes reflected the efforts of state and local governments to meet the needs of the baby-boomers as
they aged into and through the school system. In the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, however, federal
expenditures increased faster than state and local expenditures and therefore the relative share of government
expenditures from state and local government declined.
Since 1986, when baby-boomers ranged from 22 to 40 years of age, federal spending as a percentage of total
government expenditures has declined while state and local government spending has increased. This suggests
some shifting of responsibility among the different levels of government, as well as growth in the school-aged
population—the children of the baby-boomers. In 1960, state and local government spending represented 32
percent of total government spending. Today, it is closer to 40 percent.
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Figure 3-5: State and Local Government Expenditures as a 
                   Percentage of  Total Government Expenditures 
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, February 1998, Table B-83.
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Figure 3-6: Federal Expenditures, 1962 to 1998 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1999–2008, 
Tables E-8, E-10, E-12.
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3 Congressional Budget Office. (August 1998). The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
4 Grad, S. (April 1998). Income of the Population 55 or Older: 1996. Washington, DC: Social Security Administration.
5 The Kaiser Medicare Policy Project. (April 1997). The Medicare Program: Medicare at a Glance. Washington, DC: Kaiser Permanente.
THE COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET HAS CHANGED
Public expenditures on programs
for which the elderly are
significant beneficiaries have
increased, while the proportion of
the budget going towards national
defense has declined. In 1962,
defense outlays equaled 49 percent
of the federal budget. They
remained near 45 percent through
the late 1960s, but have
plummeted since then, to 
16.3 percent of the federal 
budget in 1998.3
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS NOW ACCOUNT FOR OVER 40 PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET
Federal financing of Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid
accounts for 40 percent of overall
federal spending. Some 87 percent
of Social Security benefits are paid
directly to the elderly and 87
percent of Medicare payments are
made on their behalf.4 In the case
of Medicaid, although only 11
percent of beneficiaries are elderly,
26 percent of Medicaid
expenditures go toward their care.5
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21.1% 
All other Discretionary 
Net Interest 9.2%*
Medicare 12.3%
Medicaid 5.8%
15.5% Defense 
14.4% 
Other Mandatory 
Programs
21.6% Social Security
Figure 3-7:  The Federal Budget, 1998
           Total Federal Spending = $1,738 Billion
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update, 
August 1998, Tables 2-4, 2-5, 2-6.
*Net interest does not include offsetting receipts. Offsetting receipts is included in 
All other Discretionary.
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GIVEN ANTICIPATED INCREASES IN THE NUMBERS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES,
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE
The share of the nation’s income
going to finance Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid could
increase dramatically even with no
changes in current law. The
Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) suggests, for example, that
the proportion of GDP spent on
Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid could go from 8 percent
in 1998, to 13 percent by 2020, to
more than 17 percent by 2040.
Most of the growth is projected to
be in the Medicare program, with
Medicare expenditures expected to
be larger than Social Security
benefit payments by 2045.
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Figure 3-8: Projections of Federal Expenditures
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Budgetary Pressure and Policy Options, May 1998, Table 2-1.
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WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES (REDUX)
In May 1998 CBO released new long-term
budget estimates. Again, much had changed
since it had published long-term estimates 14
months earlier (March 1997, see prior box). In
particular, CBO now anticipated that the
federal budget would be balanced in 1998 and
that there would be annual surpluses through
2008. Moreover, the Balanced Budget and
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 had been passed,
and both unemployment and inflation rates
were still low. These changes, both real and
anticipated, again improved the budget
projections for 2030.
The changes did not change the CBO’s conclusion that the ratio of federal debt to GDP would eventually 
rise, however.
Table 3-3: Change in Projections of 2030,
March 1997 to May 1998
Percentage Change
Social Security -3.5%
Medicare -17.3%
Medicaid -35.7%
Total Federal Spending -13.8%
GDP 3.5%
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Budgetary Pressures and Policy Options,
Washington, DC, May 1998, Tables 2-1 and 2-4.
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES
In May 1996 CBO released the results of a long-
term budget projection model. New projections
were released in March 1997.
In the course of one year the picture for 
2030 changed considerably. GDP was 4.6 
percent higher, and federal spending was 
8.5 percent lower.
Technical adjustments to the model itself
account for some of the differences, but more
importantly, it was a changed projection for the
current-year budget. In particular, the estimated
1996 budget deficit fell from $146 billion to $50
billion in the course of the year. This change was due primarily to better-than-expected economic results in the
very short run. In theory, a change in the fiscal conditions in 1996 should have a relatively small influence on GDP
34 years later. But, given the way such modeling must be done, small changes in a particular assumption cumulate
into a big change in how the model reports the future.
Table 3-2: Change in Projections of 2030,
May 1996 to March 1997
Percentage Change
Social Security -10.4%
Medicare 4.6%
Medicaid 4.6%
Total Federal Spending -8.5%
GDP 4.6%
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Budgetary Pressures and Policy Options, March
1997, Tables 4 and 5. Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years
1997–2006, May 1996, Tables 4-4 and 5-5.
______________________
6 These calculations use CBO’s projections of federal expenditures to 2030. In addition, state and local government expenditures are assumed to grow a bit faster than federal spending. This
assumption reflects the fact that for most years since 1950 and for all years since 1982, state and local government expenditures have grown faster than federal expenditures. This
assumption also reflects the continued Congressional actions that have devolved fiscal responsibility for government activities from the federal government to state governments. GDP is
simply assumed to grow either 1 percent or 3 percent. In real terms, federal government expenditures are expected to increase 2.7 percent per year and state and local government
expenditures are expected to increase 3 percent per year.
ECONOMIC GROWTH IS A KEY FACTOR IN DETERMINING HOW THE AGING OF SOCIETY WILL AFFECT
FUTURE GOVERNMENT SPENDING
In 1997, total federal, state, and local
government expenditures were just
over 34 percent of GDP. Depending on
what transpires at all levels of
government, as well as what happens
to economic growth, government
expenditures in 2030 may be anywhere
between 32 and 61 percent of GDP.6 As
a proportion of our nation’s income,
in other words, total government
spending may be no larger than today
or considerably larger.
Economic growth will make the
difference. For government
expenditures to remain the same share
of GDP in 2030 as today, on the
assumption that current law continues,
the economy would have to grow on
average 2.8 percent a year. Anemic real
economic growth (one percent) for 30
years will increase government
spending as a share of GDP to 61
percent. Robust real economic growth
(three percent) for 30 years will reduce
government spending as a share of
GDP to 32 percent.
Public policies that boast economic
growth even a little will increase 
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Figure 3-9: Total Government Expenditures as a 
                   Percentage of GDP through 2030, Using  
                   Two Assumptions of Economic Growth
Source: National Academy on an Aging Society calculations based on CBO projections for 2030.
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our nation’s wealth and make any level of government that much
less of a collective burden. The richer the country is, of course, the
more choices we will have about collectively sharing income.
Reasonable economic growth will result in a wealthier nation.
Decisions about how to share the additional wealth will determine
whether or not the promises inherent in current social insurance
programs will be kept. Presumably, future policy makers will
respond to both the needs and the expectations of their
constituencies, as well as to economic circumstances.
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Chapter IV
M uch of the concern regarding the capacity of the country to accommodate an aging society is based onthe needs and contributions of the current elderly. But tomorrow’s elderly will almost certainly have
different needs, behave differently and, hence, affect markets and public policy differently. There are three
important reasons why the elderly of tomorrow are likely to be different:
 America’s elderly are living in a manner that few of them could have imagined when they were younger.
They are better educated, healthier, and wealthier. Tomorrow’s elderly are likely to be better off than
today’s along all these dimensions.
 Tomorrow’s elderly are likely to face very different challenges and to have opportunities that cannot yet be
anticipated. This is because baby boomers will bring about changes in society as they age. They will also
adapt to changing circumstances.
 The future elderly are likely to be at least as diverse as their predecessors. Today’s elderly cover an age span
between 65 and 113. They include vibrant and brilliant 93-year-olds in good health as well as cognitively
impaired 66-year-olds in poor health. About 3 percent of the elderly are well off, with incomes of $75,000 a
year or more. But a little over 10 percent are poor, with incomes of $7,700 a year or less. While
improvements have occurred for the elderly as a whole, disparities in education, income, and health
persist. If these inequalities continue—or worse, if they grow—they may threaten the chances of an
improved future for us all as we grow old.
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THE ELDERLY OF TOMORROW WILL BE DIFFERENT
TODAY’S ELDERLY ARE BETTER OFF ON AVERAGE THAN THE ELDERLY OF PAST
GENERATIONS
Relative to 40 years ago the financial condition of the elderly population has improved. And the elderly as a
group are healthier than they were several decades ago. But many of today’s elderly are poor or near-poor. Many
more feel insecure financially because they have developing health problems and insufficient funds to cover the
care they are likely to need.
SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS OF ELDERLY ARE EACH BETTER EDUCATED THAN THE LAST
Table 4-1: Educational Distribution by Age and Year
Percent with Less than Percent with High School Percent with College 
High School Degree Degree or Some College Degree
Age Cohort 1969 1994 2019 1969 1994 1969 1994 2019  
(Projected) (Projected)
35 to 45 36.2 12.1 50.5 60.4 13.3 27.5
60 to 70 65.2 29.7 8–12 26.8 54.3 8 16 30–35
85+ 81.6 55.5 23–28 14.5 33.2 3.9 11.3 20–25
Source: Hadley, J., Analysis of Data from the 1969 and 1994 Health Interview Surveys, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University, 1998.
In the 25 years between 1969 and
1994, the proportion of adults who
have not completed high school in
each age group has decreased while
the proportion of adults with high
school and college degrees has
increased. These trends are expected
to continue. Only about 4 percent of
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adults over age 85 had college degrees in 1969. Fifty years later, at
least 20 percent of that age group will have a college education. A
better educated elderly population can be expected to have different
conceptions of “retirement,” with more of them potentially interested
in remaining employed longer. A better educated elderly population
is also likely to increase the demand for continuing education and
personal enrichment activities associated with universities, museums,
and other cultural institutions.
THE FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE CURRENT ELDERLY HAS IMPROVED RELATIVE TO THE ELDERLY OF THE PAST
The improvement in the overall
financial status of the elderly reflects
the growth of the economy since the
Great Depression, and the
establishment of public benefit
programs, private insurance, and
other private initiatives. The biggest
advance came from Social Security,
which began paying benefits in 1940.
Other significant changes include
health care and related social services
through Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Older Americans Act (all effective in
1966), the pension protections
provided through the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 and subsequent amendments,
and various tax law changes that
encourage and subsidize home
ownership and retirement saving.
CHANGES IN INCOME SOURCES REFLECT IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE ELDERLY
With respect to the distribution of
income sources, Social Security has
contributed most to improvements in
financial security for the elderly over
the years. In 1996, the vast majority of
the elderly (91 percent) received Social
Security benefits, compared with only
69 percent in 1962. Income from assets
and pensions is also more prevalent
now than in 1962 (although the
proportions have declined somewhat
since the late 1980s). Reliance on
public assistance by the elderly, in
contrast, has more than halved, with
six percent receiving it in 1996
compared with 14 percent in 1962.
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Figure 4-1:  Median Income of Elderly Families 
         (In 1996 Dollars)
Source: Grad, S. (May 1998), Income of the Aged Chartbook, 1996.
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Figure 4-2:  Percent of Elderly with Income Sources
Source: Grad, S. (May 1998), Income of the Aged Chartbook, 1996.
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Figure 4-4: Distribution of the Elderly by Income 
         Relative to Poverty Level , 1975 and 1997
Source: <www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hs+pov5.html>, extracted October 1998.
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the United States: 1997, Table 2.
POVERTY RATES HAVE DECLINED
As recently as the 1960s, old age
was strongly associated with
poverty. In 1960 more than one-
third of the elderly were poor.
Today, slightly over one-tenth are
poor. By 1974, the poverty rate for
the elderly had already dropped to
half the 1968 rate. The largest real
increases in Social Security benefits
occurred during that five-year
period, helped in 1972 by the
pegging of benefits to a cost of
living index. This decline in poverty
among the elderly is a major
societal accomplishment, especially
since more elderly than ever live
independently of their adult
children. The bad news is that
children are now more likely than
adults to live in a poor household.
WHILE POVERTY RATES FOR THE ELDERLY HAVE DECLINED, THE ELDERLY ARE NOT RICH
That poverty rates have fallen
and average real incomes have
increased for the elderly does
not mean that all the elderly are
well off. In 1975, about 50
percent of the elderly had
incomes less than 200 percent 
of poverty. By 1997, this
proportion had fallen only 11
percentage points to 40 percent.
The four out of 10 elderly
persons with incomes at or
below 200 percent of poverty are
particularly vulnerable to
increases in housing or out-
of-pocket health care costs or
other unexpected expenses.
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Figure 4-3:  Poverty Rate by Age
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Appendix Tables C1 and C2, 1997.
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the United States, P60-198, 1998.
Note: Data from 1962 and 1964 are unavailable.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
     
     
THE FUTURE ELDERLY ARE LIKELY TO BE BETTER-OFF FINANCIALLY THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS
Discussions about retirement
income in the future are often
based on examining the
retirement income of those who
are already elderly. This can be
misleading, because the generation
now beginning to retire has had a
uniquely beneficial set of
economic experiences. People
born between 1930 and 1940 (now
aged 58 to 68) were in the labor
force during an unusually robust
period of economic growth in the
1960s. As a group, they also saw
their home values increase
dramatically in the 1970s, and had
begun saving for retirement early
enough to take advantage of the
high interest rates in the late 1970s
and the stock market booms in
the early 1980s and mid-1990s. In
addition, they benefited from
unanticipated cost-of-living
increases in Social Security
benefits legislated by Congress and 
Table 4-2: Poverty Thresholds: 1997
Size of Family Unit Poverty Threshold
One Person
Under 65 Years $8,350
65+ Years $7,698
Two Persons
Under 65 Years $10,748
65+ Years $9,701
Three Persons $12,554
Four Persons $16,555
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 1997. <www.census.gov>
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from the pension protections instituted as part of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Thus, they were more likely
than workers in previous generations to participate in insured
pension plans with vested rights to pension benefits. Many people in
this age group were not only better off than their parents had been,
but able to maintain a solid middle-income life style, even with just a
high-school diploma.
People 20 years younger, who are now aged 38 to 58, benefited
directly from none of these circumstances. They entered the labor
force in the 1970s and early 1980s in such large numbers that they
slowed the growth in real wages. They paid higher real prices for their
homes and were not able to benefit fully from the stock market
expansion of the 1980s (although they were in a better position for
the market expansions in the mid-1990s). They are also less likely
than their predecessors to have defined-benefit pension plans to
which employers make substantial contributions. Defined
contribution retirement plans, which are really only tax-advantaged
savings plans, have become more common instead.
They did benefit from another set of factors, however. Relative to
their predecessors, they spent more time in school, delayed starting a
family, had fewer children, and are more likely to be married to a
working spouse. These adaptations, as well as others related to their
career choices and opportunities, may well provide some financial
advantages not experienced by those “fortunate” enough to have been
born between 1930 and 1940.
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BABY-BOOMERS HAVE MORE INCOME AND ASSETS THAN THEIR PARENTS DID WHEN
THEY WERE THE SAME AGE
The Congressional
Budget Office compared
the income and assets of
two generations of
people, born some 30
years apart, and found
that those aged 25 to 44
in 1989 had higher
incomes and had
accumulated more
wealth than people aged
25 to 44 thirty years
earlier, in 1959. The first
group represents
virtually all the baby
boomers. The second
group, now aged 55 to
74, consists largely of
their parents.
Table 4-3: Median Income and Wealth by Household Composition, 1959 
and 1989 (1989 Dollars)
Age 25 to 34 Age 35 to 44
1959 1989 1959 1989
All Households        
Median Income $22,300 $30,000 $25,100 $38,400
Median Wealth 6,100 9,000 29,300 54,200
Not Married
Median Income 13,000 21,900 14,200 25,300
No Children 17,000 26,000 16,800 28,700
With Children 8,100 13,300 10,900 20,900
Median Wealth 400 1,800 6,300 16,700
No Children 900 3,100 13,500 17,700
With Children 0 700 1,900 17,900
Married 
Median Income 23,300 36,700 26,700 46,800
No Children 26,500 44,500 28,000 50,500
With Children 22,700 34,600 26,300 46,200
Median Wealth 7,900 17,300 36,500 70,100
No Children 7,800 17,200 43,100 71,900
With Children 8,000 18,800 35,500 70,100
Source: Salisbury, D. & Jones, N., (ed.), Retirement in the 21st Century…Ready or Not…, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Table 3.1.
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While the baby-boom
generation is generally
in better shape
financially than their
parents, whether these
greater resources will
ensure the financial
security of the baby
boomers in 2030 is still
an open question. The
answer depends on how
much baby boomers
save between now and
when they leave the
labor force; how old and
healthy they are when
they retire; the cost,
scope, and depth of their
health insurance
coverage; and their life
expectancy. The strength
of the economy, the
housing market, the
private pension system, and the structure of government programs will also affect their financial well-being as
elderly Americans.
Table 4-4: Median Income and Wealth by Employment and Education,
1959 and 1989 (1989 Dollars)
Age 25 to 34 Age 35 to 44
1959 1989 1959 1989
Median Income        
Married, one earner $21,900 $28,100 $24,700 $38,500
Married, two earners 25,500 41,500 29,600 50,400
Median Wealth
Married, one earner 12,600 8,100 40,700 53,400
Married, two earners 5,600 28,300 34,600 92,400
Median Income 
No high school degree 18,600 16,300 20,700 20,800
High school degree 23,900 29,000 27,500 35,600
Four years of college 29,200 41,800 38,500 53,400
Median Wealth
No high school degree 800 1,600 13,900 6,100
High school degree 8,600 8,300 43,200 45,600
Four years of college 23,100 28,300 68,400 102,700
Source: Salisbury, D. & Jones, N., (ed.), Retirement in the 21st Century…Ready or Not…, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Table 3.1.
______________________
1 National Center for Health Statistics. (October 1998). Births and Deaths: Preliminary Data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Report, 47(4).
2 The lower rates after 1982 are due to revised questions in the National Health Interview Survey that mention self-care activities, rather than work or housekeeping, as the locus of disability
within the elderly population.
3 Manton, K., Corder, L., & Stallard, E. (1997). Chronic Disability Trends in Elderly in the United States. The National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 94, 2593-2598.
TODAY’S ELDERLY ARE HEALTHIER THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS
Increasing life expectancy is one
indication that, in general, today’s
elderly are healthier than their
predecessors. Since the turn of the
century the causes and
circumstances of death have
changed. Acute and infectious
diseases such as tuberculosis,
influenza, and pneumonia were
much more significant causes of
death than they are today. With
improved public health and
advances in medicine, those
diseases can be treated. Of course,
surviving acute conditions
increases the probability of
acquiring other diseases such as
cancer or heart disease, which is
the leading cause of death for the
elderly in the U.S. today. But
reductions in mortality have
occurred for these causes of death
as well. Heart disease mortality
has followed a consistent
downward trend since 1950 and
cancer mortality has declined
since 1990.1
Among the elderly, disability rates
were fairly constant in the 1970s, at 
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Figure 4-5:  Disability Rates of the Elderly, by Gender
Source: Kaye, H., LaPlante, M., Carlson, D., & Wenger, B., Trends in Trends Disability Rates in the 
United States, 1970–1994, Disability Statistics Abstract, Number 17, November 1996, Figure 2.
Note: Data for 1982 are unavailable.
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about 48 percent for men and 42 percent for women. During the 1980s
and early 1990s, they were again about constant, but at lower rates—
about 38 percent for men and 39 percent for women.2 There is some
evidence that today’s population aged 65 and older in the U.S. is less
disabled than earlier cohorts. Based on data from the 1982, 1984, 1989,
and 1994 National Long-Term Care Surveys, researchers at Duke
University found that the disability rates among persons 65 and older
declined by 1.3 percent per year between 1982 and 1994. This resulted in
1.2 million fewer seniors with disabilities in 1994 than if the disability
rate had not declined. This decline has many experts discussing the
likelihood of further declines in disability rates in the future.3
______________________
4 U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to 1970, p. 8, 127. (1960 Data).
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Table 1334, p. 831; (1997 Population Data).
Bureau of Labor Statistics <ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aatl.txt >.
5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Ibid.
TOMORROW’S ELDERLY ARE LIKELY TO FACE VERY DIFFERENT CHALLENGES AND TO HAVE
OPPORTUNITIES THAT CANNOT YET BE ANTICIPATED
Many institutions and expectations changed to accommodate the baby-boomers as they went through
childhood, adolescence, and their adult working years. The educational system, the labor market, and the
housing markets have changed over the past five decades. The structure of the family has also changed—as have
where and how the elderly live, what their heath care needs are, and who cares for them. In the coming decades,
as society ages, more changes are certain. Recent trends indicate how different life may be in the future.
THE CHANGING LABOR FORCE: MORE WOMEN OF ALL AGES ARE WORKING MORE
Since 1950, the labor force increased by 120
percent4 and the population by only 78
percent. The difference stems from a dramatic
change in the labor force participation of
women, generally, and women with young
children, in particular.
Women, including women aged 55 to 64, are
more likely to be in the labor force today than
women in the same age range nearly 40 years
ago. The work force participation of older
women aged 65 to 69 has also increased in
recent years. And the proportion of married
women in the labor force with young children
has doubled just since 1970.5
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Figure 4-6: Labor Force Participation Rates 
                   for Women, by Age 
                   
Source: Quinn, J. Retirement Patterns and Bridge Jobs in the 1990s.
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6 Quinn, J. (1997). Retirement Trends and Patterns in the 1990s: The End of an Era?, Public Policy and Aging Report, 8(3), 10-14.
7 American Association of Retired Persons Public Policy Institute. (1998). Boomers Approaching Midlife: How Secure a Future?, Washington, DC: AARP.
THE CHANGING LABOR FORCE: OLDER MEN ARE ALSO MORE LIKELY TO WORK NOW THAN JUST A
DECADE AGO
For decades, successive cohorts of men
retired at younger and younger ages.
Labor force participation rates for men
aged 65, for example, declined from
about 72 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in
1995. Since then, however, labor force
participation rates for men in this age
group have increased somewhat. And the
patterns are similar for men in other age
cohorts.
A number of factors probably
contributed to the initial decline. For
some men, a sense of financial security
provided by the prospect of pension and
Social Security payments or income from
a working spouse led to a decision to
retire early and pursue other interests.
Others had to leave the work force for
health reasons. And still others were
encouraged to retire by employer-
provided retirement plans.
The very recent trend for both men and
women to remain in the work force longer
may reflect decisions they have made in
response to financial necessity, or to the
financial uncertainty associated with life
spans that can continue for 30 years or
more past the traditional retirement 
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Figure 4-7: Labor Force Participation Rates for Men, 
        by Age
Source: Quinn, J. Retirement Patterns and Bridge Jobs in the 1990s.
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age. Increased labor force participation rates may also reflect new
opportunities for older workers or an interest on their part in
prolonging the intellectual or social stimulation associated with
their jobs. Going from full-time “career” jobs to other “bridge” jobs
(including part-time jobs or self-employment) before full
retirement has also become more common.6 Although the next 20
years will see growing numbers approaching the age at which
workers traditionally left the labor force, the choices future workers
will make are by no means predictable from the choices workers
made in the past. Over 70 percent of baby boomers, for example,
say they plan to continue working at least part-time after age 65.7
______________________
8 McGarry, K. & Schoeni, R. (1998). Social Security, Economic Growth, and the Rise in Independence of Elderly Widows in the 20th Century. Presented at Syracuse University, September 1998.
9 McGarry, K. & Schoeni, R. (1995). Transfer Behavior in the Health and Retirement Study. Journal of Human Resources, 30.
10 McGarry, K. & Schoeni, R. (1997). Transfer Behavior Within the Family: Results from the Asset and Health Dynamics Study. The Journals of Gerontology, 52(B).
FAMILY STRUCTURE HAS CHANGED
Since 1960, family structure has
changed considerably and family
relationships have become more
complex. Men and women both marry
later on average. The divorce rate has
risen. A higher share of babies is born to
unmarried mothers. And a higher share
of families is headed by a single parent.
These changes relative to two or three
decades ago suggest how impossible it is
to know now how families will organize
and define their relations and
obligations 40 years from now.
CHANGES IN LIVING SITUATIONS: TODAY’S ELDERLY ARE LESS LIKELY TO LIVE WITH RELATIVES AND
MORE LIKELY TO LIVE ALONE
With respect to the elderly, the proportion
living with spouses has increased slightly
since 1960. But the real change is the
smaller proportion of elderly living with
other relatives—down from almost one-
quarter in 1960 to only about 13 percent
in 1990. Thus, it is no surprise that the
proportion of elderly people living alone
increased substantially, from less than 19
percent to 31 percent, during the same
period. The share of elderly widows living
alone, for example, rose from 18 percent
in 1940 to 62 percent in 1990, while the
share living with adult children declined
from 59 percent to 20 percent. Income
growth, particularly increased Social
Security benefits, was the single most
important factor causing this.8
Family members are less likely to live
near one another today than in the past.
In a 1992 study of 51 to 61 year-olds,
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Figure 4-8: Living Arrangements of the Non-
        Institutionalized Elderly
       
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports <www.census.gov>
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Table 4-5: Changes in Family Structure  
1960 Today
Average Age of Marriage
Men   22.8 26.9a
Women    20.3 24.5a
Divorce Rate (per 1,000)   2.2 4.1a
Household Size 3.1c 2.7d
Percent of Births to Unmarried Mothers 21.6 32.6b
Percent of Families Headed by a Single Parent 22.0e 32.0d
Percent of Single Parent Families Headed by Fathers 10.0c 17.0
a 1995; b 1994; c 1970; d 1996; e 1980
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Tables 66, 75, 88, 89. U.S. Census Bureau,
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Series B28-35. U.S. Census Bureau, Population-
Special Subjects Current Population Reports, P20-484, March 1984. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports,
P20–515, March 1998.
less than half—some 40 percent—reported that they had children
living within 10 miles.9 In a 1994 study of persons aged 70 and older,
only 35 percent said their children lived 10 miles away or closer.10
______________________
11 Komisar, H., Lambrew, J., & Feder, J. (1996). Long-Term Care for the Elderly Chart Book. Washington, DC: Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University.
12 Ibid.
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CHANGES IN CAREGIVING: FAMILIES WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE, BUT MORE
ASSISTANCE WILL PROBABLY BE REQUIRED
In the future, there is every expectation
that the pool of potential caregivers
will grow smaller. Smaller family sizes
mean fewer children to provide long-
term care for their parents. Increased
mobility means that adult children are
less likely to live nearby. More younger
and older women in the work force
leaves fewer at home to provide care.
Meanwhile, the pool of potential
caregivers may also become more
varied. Longer life expectancies make it
more likely that there will be
grandchildren who can assist family
members. With more divorce, there
may be more ex-spouses involved with
the care of former family members.
And smaller family sizes, without a
commensurate reduction in the size of
homes, suggest that more families will
have room to bring a parent or other
relative to live with them.
Given the preference of most families
to care for their own—and the
financial necessity for some families
to do so—families will almost
certainly continue to play a major
role in providing care. Employers
have already responded to changing
family needs, both in the area of
child care and eldercare. More
recently, federal legislation followed
the lead of many larger employers in
establishing specific eldercare rights 
in the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1992. But the anticipated
increase in the number of people needing long-term care still raises a
serious challenge, given that the current system of care does not
adequately assist families with the care of parents and grandparents
who are already elderly.
Almost 80 percent of the elderly with limitations in their ability to
function from day to day live at home or in a community-based setting.
Virtually all of them receive at least some unpaid, non-professional
assistance, the majority of which comes from family members. Adult
children account for 31 percent of all informal caregivers, and
daughters constitute almost two-thirds of adult children caregivers.11
Spouses constitute only 5 percent of all informal caregivers. But almost
23 percent of caregivers aged 50 and over are spouses. More wives
provide care than husbands.12 But the greater numbers of younger and
older women in the paid work force leave fewer women at home to
provide care, a trend that is likely to continue.
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Figure 4-9: Informal Caregivers of the Elderly in the 
                   Community, 1997
Source: National Alliance for Caregiving & the American Association of Retired Persons, Family 
Caregiving in the U.S., 1997.
Note: The average age of the care recipient is 77 years.
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WHO ARE THE ELDERLY’S CAREGIVERS?
There is no universal
definition of “caregiving.”
Most accept it to mean
informal care performed by
relatives and close friends for a
person who is no longer able
to manage critical aspects of
daily life. Caregivers generally
provide assistance for IADLs
(instrumental activities of
daily living related to
managing a household, such as
shopping or cleaning) or ADLs
(activities of daily living
related to performing personal
care such as  toileting and
feeding).
The majority of caregivers (85 percent) care for a relative, the remaining 15 percent care for a friend or neighbor.
Care recipients average 77 years of age; 40 percent are over 75, and 24 percent are over 85. The typical caregiver is a
married woman in her mid-forties who works full-time, is a high school graduate, and has an annual household
income of $35,000. There is, however, tremendous diversity around this average portrait.
It is remarkable to note that most long-term care is provided by family caregivers and that families persist in
providing substantial amounts of care despite the presence of professional caregivers. Thus, whether a family uses
privately or publicly financed assistance, family members continue to be important sources of caregiving.
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Figure 4-10: Prevalence of Informal Caregiving in 
          Households, by Race
Source: National Alliance for Caregiving and the American Association of Retired Persons, 
Family Caregiving in the U.S., 1997.
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Caregiving can be taxing. In a recent study by the Alzheimer’s Association, 75 percent of all caregivers reported
being depressed at least occasionally and 34 percent reported being depressed frequently or almost always.1 Some
15 percent of caregivers experience physical or mental health problems due to caregiving. 2
Caring for the elderly also has costs for both employers and employees. More than half of caregivers are employed,
and productivity in the work
place can suffer because of
caregiving activities. Work
accommodations caregivers
make include changes in daily
schedules (49 percent), taking
a leave of absence (11
percent), and working fewer
hours or taking a less
demanding job (7 percent). 3
Some caregivers even leave
the work force altogether to
provide care. In fact, almost
one-third of caregivers who
administer care to persons
needing help with two or
more ADLs report giving up
work entirely. 4
1 Alzheimer’s Association, An Exploration of the Plight of an Alzheimer Caregiver, August, 1996.
2 National Alliance for Caregiving and the American Association of Retired Persons, Family Caregiving in the U.S., 1997.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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THE FUTURE ELDERLY ARE LIKELY TO BE AT LEAST AS DIVERSE AS THEIR PREDECESSORS
If only the averages are considered, it may be reasonable to be complacent about the future. But the fact that
conditions for the elderly as a whole have improved in the recent past—and that there is likely to be a great deal
more advantageous change in the future—is only part of the story. The more detailed examination of the data
presented below shows that certain groups are very vulnerable. The gap in educational attainment among the
baby boomers indicates that tomorrow’s elderly will be a diverse group. Current financial disparities are likely to
persist or grow and some individuals will be much healthier than others. Recent trends indicate the need for
particular concern about certain segments of tomorrow’s elderly population. Women are much more likely than
men to be poor, for example. And African-American and Hispanic women tend to be poorer than other
women. If policies to accommodate the elderly are to be effective, they must be geared to the neediest as well as
to the better educated, the wealthier, and the healthier.
COLLEGE GRADUATES ARE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE HIGHER INCOMES AND TO BE HEALTHIER IN OLD AGE
The disparity in earnings between
the elderly who have not
completed high school and those
who have college degrees has
increased considerably in the last
20 years. In addition to having
higher incomes and assets, older
people with more education also
tend to be healthier, have fewer
disabilities, later onset of chronic
disease, and lower death rates.
Plausible reasons are better access
to and understanding of
information about how to stay
healthy or to obtain treatment. If
the trend toward more education
continues, income and health
disparities among the future
elderly may increase.
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Figure 4-12: Percent of Elderly with Income at $40,000
         or more by Education and Year
Source: Hadley, J., Analysis of the Preliminary Tables from 1969 and 1994 Health Interview Surveys.
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INCOME AMONG THE ELDERLY IS NOT EVENLY DISTRIBUTED
Dividing the total income of the
elderly population into equal dollar
quintiles (20 percent shares) is a
good way of illustrating the range
of income inequality among the
elderly. The top 20 percent of
elderly income, for example, is
shared among just 6 percent of
elderly households, all of which
have incomes above $51,200 a year.
The bottom 20 percent of elderly
income is spread among 34 percent
of elderly households, all of which
have incomes below $10,620 a year.
The next to lowest 20 percent of
elderly income is spread among 30
percent of elderly households, all of
which have incomes between
$10,620 and $20,306 a year. Putting
the bottom two percentiles
together reveals that nearly two-
thirds of elderly households have
incomes below $20,000 a year.
SOME GROUPS OF ELDERLY ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE
Generally, married elderly couples have
more income than single elderly
individuals, and elderly men have more
income than elderly women. Whites
have substantially more income than
blacks or Hispanics. Thus, incomes are
highest among younger, married, white
elderly, and lowest among older, single
Hispanic women. Among non-married
women aged 85 or older, median family
income in 1996 was $13,667. Among
married couples aged 65 to 69, it was
nearly three times as high, at $35,764.
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Figure 4-13: Distribution of Total Elderly Income by 
          Income Quintile Share, 1995
Source: Health Care Financing Administration. (May 1998). A Profile of Medicare Chartbook, Figure 8.
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Table 4-6: Median Income of Elderly Households by Selected Characteristics: 1996
All 65 Age 65 Age 70 Age 75 Age 80 Age 85
or Older to 69 to 74 to 79 to 84 or Older
All Elderly* $20,535 $26,030 $21,968 $18,191 $17,150 $15,940
White+ 16,954
Black+ 9,649
Hispanic+ 8,854
All Married Couples* $30,040 $35,764 $29,933 $26,578 $26,153 $24,485
White+ 28,392
Black+ 20,464
Hispanic+ 16,406
Nonmarried Males* $18,157 $18,494 $18,130 $20,499 $16,377 $16,429
White+ 14,300
Black+ 10,050
Hispanic+ 7,725
Nonmarried Females* $13,932 $16,271 $14,323 $12,938 $12,716 $13,677
White+ 11,205
Black+ 7,286
Hispanic+ 6,791
*Based on total family income of all relatives residing in the household.
+Based on total income of the aged unit within a household. ( Aged units are defined as married couples who live together--at least one of whom is
55 or older—and nonmarried persons age 55 or older).
Source: Grad, S. (April 1998). Income of the Population 55 or Older, 1996, Tables II.1. and III.3.
INCOME IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN GREATER FOR SOME GROUPS THAN OTHERS
While poverty rates have declined
for all elderly, the largest
improvement since 1959 has
occurred among the black
population. The poverty rate for
elderly whites remains far below
the rate for black and Hispanic
elders, however.
SHARES OF INCOME VARY CONSIDERABLY FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH DIFFERENT INCOMES
For those elderly in the top
quintile of the elderly’s income
distribution (the wealthiest 20
percent), Social Security
contributes only 21 percent of
their total income. For all the
other elderly as a group, Social
Security provides almost half (47
percent) or more of their total
income. For those whose income
is within the bottom two quintiles
(the poorest 40 percent), Social
Security is critical, providing over
80 percent of their total income.
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Figure 4-15: Share of Income from Various Sources  
          for the Elderly, by Household Income 
          Quintile, 1996
Source: Grad, S. (April 1998). Income of the Population 55 or Older, April 1996, Table VII.5.
*Includes railroad retirement, government employee pensions, private pensions, and annuities.
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Figure 4-14:  Poverty Rates of the Elderly by Race, 
         1959 to 1994
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Income Poverty, and Valuation of Noncash Benefits, 1994. Table B-6.
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______________________
13 Median wealth measures total assets (excluding income from pensions and Social Security) minus liabilities.
14 Health Care Financing Administration. (May 1998). A Profile of Medicare Chartbook. Washington, DC: Department of Health and Human Services.
Medicare covers people with end-stage renal disease, and totally disabled people under age 65 who qualify because either they or their spouse or parent worked for 10 years in jobs that
were covered by Social Security. In 1997, Medicare had about 39 million beneficiaries, of which 13 percent were under age 65. About 66 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries using fee-for-
service have private supplemental insurance, either through an employer and/or purchased individually. About 13 percent of fee-for-service beneficiaries do not purchase other coverage.
On the other hand, only 25 percent of beneficiaries enrolled in risk health maintenance organizations have private supplemental insurance. Sixty-eight percent of these beneficiaries rely on
Medicare alone.
15 It should be noted that Medicare covers post-acute care. Since many of the post-acute care services are the same as long-term care services (e.g., home health care), some long-term care is
financed by Medicare under the guise of post-acute medical care.
THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION IS UNEVEN
In 1993, the elderly’s median net
wealth amounted to $86,324.13
Most of this wealth was in their
homes. If home equity is excluded,
median net wealth of the elderly
in 1993 drops to $20,642. Among
the elderly in the lowest 20 percent
of the income distribution,
median assets averaged $30,400
with home, and less than $3,000
without it. Among the top 20
percent, median wealth averaged
$354,781 with home and $215,000
without it.
THE ELDERLY ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO THE COST OF HEALTH CARE
Differences in health are a primary reason for the tremendous differences in well-being among the elderly
population. First, health status is the major factor that determines whether people are able to lead active,
independent lives. Second, health is an important determinant of economic well-being, because the cost of
health and long-term care can be so high that it substantially drains elderly people’s financial resources.
Since 1965, the elderly have had a great deal more financial and health security than ever before, because of the
federal Medicare program. Virtually all the elderly today have health care coverage through Medicare. But not all
health care or services related to day-to-day functioning are covered by Medicare or by private supplemental
insurance policies.14 Medicare does not cover prescription drugs or long-term care, for example.15 Medicare enrollees
are also required to meet deductibles and make copayments. Thus, many of the elderly still must make substantial
out-of-pocket payments for care. The Medicaid program may fill gaps in Medicare coverage for the low-income
elderly. But the high cost of health care—particularly long-term care, for which few people have insurance
coverage—can be financially devastating for families not much above the income cut-off for Medicaid eligibility.
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Figure 4-16: Median Net Wealth of Householders 
          Age 65 or Older, by Household Income 
          Quintile, 1993
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Survey of Income and Program Participation, Asset Ownership of Households: 1993.
Median Net Wealth
Excluding Home Equity
______________________
16 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Research Notes, February 1995.
17 Calculations by the National Academy on an Aging Society using lower and upper bound disability rates for 2018 from Weiner et al. (1994) applied to the U.S. Census Bureau’s middle
series projected population for 2030.
AS PEOPLE SURVIVE LONGER THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO DEVELOP CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRE
ONGOING ASSISTANCE
Some 17.1 million elderly people have some
form of disability, according to 1990 figures,
with disability broadly defined as having
conditions that make it difficult to perform
certain activities. For the elderly, the main
conditions leading to disability are coronary
heart disease, bad back, respiratory
conditions, visual impairments, stiffness, and
stroke.16 In addition, some people become
disabled because of cognitive impairments
such as senile dementia, or physical changes
such as loss of strength and agility.
About 7.3 million of the disabled elderly need
hands-on assistance from others to
function on a day-to-day basis. The need
for assistance with ADLs (activities of daily 
living) and IADLs (instrumental activities 
MILLIONS ARE PROJECTED TO NEED LONG-TERM CARE IN THE FUTURE
Estimates based primarily on
current disability rates and applied
to the number of elderly
anticipated in the future suggest
the high likelihood that more
people will need long-term care in
the future. Estimates vary,
however. Projections of the
number of elderly needing long-
term care by 2030 range from 10.8
million to almost 14 million.17
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Figure 4-17: Percent of Elderly Community Residents 
         with Functional Limitations, 1995
Source: Komisar, H., Lambrew, J., and Feder, J., (1996) Long-Term Care for the Elderly: A Chart Book, 
The Commonwealth Fund, Chart 1-10.
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Figure 4-18: Projections of the Number of Elderly who 
          Will Need Long-Term Care
Source: Estimates for 1997 and 2005 from Health Insurance Association of America, Guide to Long-Term 
Care Insurance, 1997. Estimates for 2018 from Wiener, J., L. Illston, & R. Hanley. Sharing the Burden: 
Strategies for Public and Private Long-Term Care Insurance. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 
1994. Estimates for 2030 from National Academy on an Aging Society calculations.
of daily living) increases with age. The proportion of people age
85 and older who need assistance is more than double that of
those age 84 and younger for all levels of functional limitation.
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CHANGES IN MEDICAL SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND BEHAVIOR AFFECT HEALTH CARE
NEEDS
Recent advances in medicine, and current knowledge about the potential health effects of behavioral change make
it reasonable to assume that the future health care needs of the elderly will be different from those needs today.
Medications and procedures that could not even be imagined a few years ago have radically changed the way some
diseases are treated and have limited the threat they pose. While heart disease remains the number one cause of
death, patients have a much greater chance of surviving a heart attack and controlling heart disease because
procedures such as coronary angiography, angioplasty, new approaches to cardiac surgery, and new medications
have been developed. Immunizations for polio, mumps, and chicken pox have all but eradicated those diseases.
Laser technology has led to new, less invasive surgical techniques for many health conditions, such as heart
disease, skin cancer, and eye problems. Research in biotechnology and genetics is also expanding the prospects for
future cures. New diseases such as AIDS and the proliferation of cancer offer new challenges, but there is also
tremendous scientific potential for the twenty-first century.
Lifestyle choices can affect health and longevity as well. Physical activity has protective effects for several chronic
diseases, including coronary heart disease, hypertension, non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, osteoporosis,
colon cancer, depression, and anxiety.1 Increasingly, older people are engaging in moderate physical activity to
improve the overall quality of their lives.
The risk of heart disease falls when people stop smoking, regardless of the age at which they stop, the length of
time they smoked, or how much they smoked.2 Male deaths from lung cancer have begun to fall as a consequence
of the decline in smoking that began three decades ago. Lung cancer deaths continue to climb, however, because
elderly women are more likely to have smoked than the generation that preceded them.3 Projections show that
there would be 11 percent fewer deaths in 20 years if all U.S. smokers stopped smoking, other things equal.4
Diet is another controllable risk factor affecting long-term health.5 Despite current knowledge about the best
practices to promote health, the extent to which tomorrow’s elderly will adopt those practices is not known. It is
clear, however, that many people have the potential to improve their own future health status.
1 National Center for Health Statistics, Healthy People 2000 Review, 1995—96, Hyattsville, Maryland: Public Health Service, 1996, p. 31.
2 Kahn, R., and Rowe, J., Successful Aging, Pantheon, 1998, p. 67.
3 Treas, J. (1995). Older Americans in the 1990s and Beyond, Population Bulletin, 50(2), 16.
4 Research Activities, No. 216, June 1998, p. 1.
5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Surgeon General’s Report on Nutrition and Health, Washington: Public Health Service, 1988.
THE LOW-INCOME ELDERLY ARE MORE LIKELY THAN THOSE WITH HIGHER INCOMES TO NEED HELP
WITH ADLS
Older women have more difficulty
with activities of daily living than
older men do. Regardless of
gender, however, income is
associated with health status. A
higher proportion of poor and
near-poor elderly of both genders
report difficulties compared with
middle- or high-income elderly.
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Figure 4-19: Difficulty with One or More ADLs among 
          Adults Age 70 and Older
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 1998, Figure 34.
MINORITY ELDERLY ARE POORER IN HEALTH AND IN OTHER RESOURCES
Nonwhites are more likely than whites to have little education, live in substandard housing, and be poor,
malnourished, and in bad health. Poverty rates for minority elderly relative to their white counterparts have not
improved since the 1970s. Poverty rates among older minorities, especially older, black women, averaged three
times the rate of poverty for older whites.1 Almost one in three white households report a financial inheritance,
according to one study, compared with only one in ten minority households.2
Life expectancy at age 65 is 17.6 years for whites and 15.8 years for blacks, at least in part because of these
socioeconomic disadvantages.3
People at the lower end of the socioeconomic range suffer disproportionately from major diseases such as
cardiovascular problems, diabetes, cancer and hypertension as well as from a variety of illnesses.4 Both Black and
Hispanic elderly tend to underuse health care services, which is closely related to their ability to pay.
Many are uninsured and often go without needed health care. Three-quarters of the white elderly have private
insurance coverage compared with 44 percent of the black elderly and 39 percent of older people of Hispanic
origin. In some cases, inability to pay for health care may result in death at an earlier age than if health care had
been affordable.5 In addition, there are theories that are yet to have empirical backup that years of discrimination
and inequality may affect minority elders’ mental health, and through that, the aging process.
1 Harper, M. (Ed). (1990). Minority aging, Health resources and services administration. Department of Health and Human Services, Pub. No.(P-DV-90-4). Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
2 Smith, J. Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth in the Health and Retirement Survey. The Journal of Human Resources, 30.
3 National Center for Health Statistics. (September 1997). Monthly Vital Statistics Report, 46, 1(S)2.
4 Binstock, R. & George, L. (1996). Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences. (3rd Ed.). San Diego, CA: Press.
5 Harper, M. (1990)
______________________
18 U.S. General Accounting Office. (March 1998). Long-Term Care: Baby-Boom Generation Presents Financing Challenges. Testimony Before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, Table 1, p.3.
Washingon D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
19 American Health Care Association, (1998). Today’s Nursing Facilities and the People They Serve. Washington, DC: American Health Care Association.
20 Health Insurance Association of America. (1997). Guide to long-term health care. Washington, D.C.: Health Insurance Association of America.
National Association for Home Care. (1997). Basic Statistics About Home Care. Washington, D.C. National Association of Home Care.
21 Grad, S. (May 1998). Income of the Aged Chartbook, 1996. Washington, D.C.: Social Security Administration.
LONG-TERM CARE POSES A SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR MANY ELDERLY
In 1995, expenditures for long-term care for the elderly totaled $91 billion, of which 70 percent of was for
nursing home care and 30 percent for home health care.18 Out-of-pocket spending accounted for 39 percent of
expenditures for long-term care.
The average nursing home stay today costs about $3,300 a month.19 Home health care costs vary from $1,000 a
month to over $3,000 a month depending on the level of disability.20 In 1996 median monthly income among
elderly families was $1,342.21 Elders who need long-term care are clearly financially strapped.
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WHAT IF THERE IS A CURE?
The enormous uncertainty related to making predictions about the need for long-term care and the cost of care in
the future is illustrated by alternative scenarios associated with a single condition: Alzheimer’s disease, which
currently affects some four million people in the United States. The Alzheimer’s Association estimates that the
direct and indirect costs of Alzheimer’s disease total at least $100 billion each year, making it the third most
expensive disease in the United States (after heart disease and cancer).1
The Association predicts that about 14 million Americans will have the disease by the middle of the next century.
Based on current treatment modalities, the projected cost of caring for the disease could reach $350 billion per
year, in 1998 dollars, and the need for long-term care would increase commensurately.
If researchers develop a cure for Alzheimer’s disease, its financial and long-term care burdens will be greatly
reduced. If, in contrast, no cure is found and even more people than predicted are affected, the costs will be yet
more staggering. And the costs associated with the disease could be higher still if new expensive technologies or
drugs are developed to test for or treat the disease, or if new types of facilities are built to care for patients with it.
Many Alzheimer’s patients are now treated at home.
1 Alzheimer’s Association. (1998). <http://www.alz.org.facts.html>.
______________________
22 Zedlewski, S. & McBride, T. (1992). The Changing Profile of the Elderly: Effects on Future Long-Term Care. The Milbank Quarterly, 70(2).
23 Kemper, P. & Murtaugh, C. (1991). Lifetime Use of Nursing Home Care. The New England Journal of Medicine.
OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENSES FOR NURSING HOME RESIDENTS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
In 1993, it was
estimated that nursing
home residents age 65
to 84 spent, on average,
over 30 percent of their
income on nursing
home care. For nursing
home residents age 85
and older, on average,
40 percent of their
income was spent on
nursing home care.
THE NURSING HOME POPULATION MAY INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY
By 2030, according to one estimate, some
5.3 million elderly people are expected
to need nursing home care. Another
estimate puts the number between 4.3
and 5.3 million, depending on mortality
projections.22 Over half of all women
and about a third of all men who survive
to age 65 can expect to spend some time
in a nursing home before they die. About
25 percent of those entering a nursing
home will spend less than three months
there; about 50 percent will spend at least
1 year; but about 21 percent will spend at
least five years. The likelihood of entering
a nursing home increases with age.
Nearly 19 percent of the population aged
85 and older live in nursing homes.23
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Figure 4-21: Nursing Home Population by Age
Source: American Council on Life Insurance, Who Will Pay for the Baby Boomers' Long-Term Care Needs? 
Expanding the Role of Private Long-Term Care Insurance, Figure 2, 1998.
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Source: Komisar, H., Lambrew, J., and Feder, J., (1996). Long-Term Care for the Elderly: A Chart Book, The Commonwealth 
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NURSING HOME EXPENDITURES ARE PROJECTED TO INCREASE
Based on recent trends, total
expenditures for nursing home
care are projected to more than
triple by 2030. If cures are found
for particularly expensive
conditions such as Alzheimer’s
disease, expenditures could be
lower. But if other debilitating
conditions affect large portions of
the population, expenditures
could be higher.
OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS FOR NURSING HOME CARE ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE
Nursing home residents and their
families currently finance 31
percent of all nursing home
expenditures. Projections suggest
that, under current law, this
proportion will increase to nearly
48 percent by 2030.
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Figure 4-22:  Total Nursing Home Expenditures 
Source: American Council on Life Insurance, Who Will Pay for the Baby Boomers' Long-Term Care Needs? 
Expanding the Role of Private Long-Term Care Insurance, Figure 3, 1998.
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Figure 4-23: Out-of-Pocket Costs for Nursing Home 
          Services
Source: American Council on Life Insurance, Who Will Pay for the Baby Boomers' Long-Term Care Needs? 
Expanding the Role of Private Long-Term Care Insurance, Figure 6, 1998.
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24 American Association of Retired Persons Public Policy Institute & the Lewin Group. (1997). Out-of-Pocket Health Spending by Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Older: 1997 projections.
Pub. No. 9705. Washington, DC: AARP.
25 The 1997 poverty threshold used was $7,755 for individuals and $9,780 for couples. Twice the poverty threshold for a couple is $19,560, or $1,630 a month.
26 The average health care expense related to out-of-pocket costs is somewhat misleading. Most Medicare beneficiaries have few health care expenditures in any given year. In 1992, about 55
percent of all Medicare beneficiaries incurred less than $500 in health expenditures; yet at the time, the average Medicare expenditure was nearly $3,400 per beneficiary. This discrepancy
arises because more than 80 percent of Medicare’s expenditures are attributable to the health care needs of less than 20 percent of Medicare’s beneficiaries.
Many Elderly People Have Substantial Health Care Expenses
If long-term care is excluded, the
average elderly Medicare beneficiary
spends in excess of $2,100 for private
insurance premiums, Medicare
premiums, and other out-of-pocket
costs.24 More than half of these out-
of-pocket expenditures are for private
or Medicare Part B premiums.
Expenditures for prescription drugs
account for another 16 percent.
Out-of-pocket health care expenses,
excluding long-term care, account
for 19 percent of household income
on average. The figure for elderly
Medicare beneficiaries with
household incomes below the
poverty threshold is 35 percent.25
The large proportion of elderly with
family incomes between 100 and
200 percent of the poverty level
average health care expenses of 22
to 23 percent of their income.26
DIFFERENT POLICIES WILL BE NEEDED FOR A DIFFERENT POPULATION
The future elderly are certain to be different from today’s elderly, but since no one can yet predict exactly how
they will differ, an important aspect of policies geared to the future should be flexibility. In considering the
needs of the current and future elderly and the contributions they will make, it is also important to look beyond
the averages and consider all segments of the population. Flexibility and comprehensiveness are two of the
fundamental challenges for policy makers.
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Figure 4-24: Average Out-of-Pocket Health Costs for Non-
          Institutionalized Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries 
          as a Percent of Household Income by 
          Income Status, 1997
Source: American Association of Retired Persons Public Policy Institute & the Lewin Group, Out-of-Pocket 
Health Spending by Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Older: 1997 Projections, Figure 5.
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Chapter V
In considering the potential implications of demographic projections, it is important to remember thatpublic policy can be used to alter the future. This chapter examines policies can change the future, and looks
at the special challenges posed for the financing of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—all of them large
federal entitlement programs. Here are the chapter’s major highlights:
 Policies that promote economic growth, redistribute income, influence individual behaviors, or even affect
the demographic profile of the population will all change our future.
 While recognizing that public policy can affect the future, we must also come to terms with the fact that an
aging and longer living population may increase both public and private costs.
 With sufficient economic growth, which is achievable, projected government spending will be no larger as
a percent of national income than it is today. Less economic growth will leave us with tough choices—
involving cutting benefits or raising taxes, possibly in the context of declining living standards.
 Any reasonable economic growth will result in a wealthier nation. Public policy decisions determine
whether the additional resources will be distributed and, if so, to whom.
 In evaluating the costs of social insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security it is important to
consider the benefits these programs provide, and what the alternatives would be if those benefits did not
exist. It should also be recognized that the financial risks associated with health care, long-term care, and
retirement income generally exist regardless of financing decisions. Society will have to contend with those
costs regardless of what happens to specific programs.
 While policy makers must recognize that no one can fully anticipate how markets and people will adapt to
changes in the future, prudent public policy calls for action today. But, policies should be developed with
the flexibility to make adjustments as circumstances change.
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POLICY MATTERS
PUBLIC POLICY CAN AFFECT THE FUTURE
Through government there is a wide range of options to influence the decisions people and institutions make
about many aspects of life. Activities such as collecting and providing information, configuring the tax code,
regulating specific actions, and directly purchasing services or providing assistance to individuals can alter the
manner in which Americans live.
POLICIES THAT AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH
Small differences in overall economic growth will dramatically alter the financial consequences of an aging
society. An important goal of every nation is to promote economic growth. Hence, public policy can be
expected to encourage growth, regardless of demographic change.
Projected demographic changes suggest that in the near-term there will be a relative slowdown in the growth of
workers under age 50. At the same time, the work force over age 50 is expected to grow. These changes suggest that
public policies should be considered that increase the skills and productivity of older workers in the near-term and
younger workers in the future. These include efforts to improve early childhood development, education, training,
and life-long learning. In addition, public policies could be considered that encourage and support employment
opportunities for older workers without penalizing those unable or unwilling to continue working.
Public policy can influence technology in ways that will improve labor productivity. Tax policy concerning
research and development and patent laws, as well as policies affecting international trade, for example, can
influence entrepreneurial efforts and employment opportunities. Government also plays a direct role in
encouraging scientific and technological advancement, by financing the basic research and development that is
then made available to private enterprises.
POLICIES THAT REDISTRIBUTE INCOME
A central function of government has been to support economic growth and prosperity among the citizenry. In
a market-based economy, government works towards improving the inherent efficiencies of the private market.
All market-based economies recognize that some redistribution of income is necessary, however. Redistribution
may be used to improve market efficiency, to provide a safeguard for some of the unjust aspects of a market-
based economy, or to better spread the risks that people face. Public assistance and social insurance programs
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are generally used to achieve these goals.
The majority of redistributive spending in the United States is for social insurance programs such as Social
Security, Disability Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, Workman’s Compensation, and Medicare. The United
States has a long history of providing social insurance and income security. Even before passage of the Social
Security Act in 1935, for example, states had various versions of unemployment insurance and workers
compensation. A few states were even developing old-age assistance programs, and all states had public laws and
programs to provide assistance with food, shelter, and medical care to people with few resources of their own.
Social insurance and public assistance programs offer a minimum level of protection to workers and their
dependents when a worker is unemployed, injured, becomes disabled, or dies prior to retirement. Social
Security also provides a public pension for retirees and a survivor’s benefit for retirees’ widows. Medicare, with
help from Medicaid, enhances access to health care, regardless of ability to pay or health status. Public assistance
programs also redistribute income and provide a measure of security against absolute destitution.
While some aspects of the risks covered by social insurance and public assistance programs are also covered by
private insurance, the government-sponsored programs have provisions that are not likely to be replicated by
private insurance plans. For example, although the private market competes to sell annuities, there is no private
market annuity that will increase with inflation and continue to pay throughout a person’s life. Social Security’s
Old Age Assistance does exactly that—providing a true lifetime inflation-adjusted annuity. And although the
private market competes to sell health insurance, a competitive market cannot offer a policy open to everyone
at the same price regardless of health status, as Medicare does.
POLICIES THAT INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR
Social insurance and public assistance programs define both individual and collective responsibility. Social
insurance programs provide a floor of protection upon which private voluntary actions can build and enhance
financial and health security. Information, regulation, grants, and tax policy are among the primary public
policy tools. In addition, public policies and public resources can be used to encourage individuals to increase
savings or investments; to pursue higher education; to enter or leave the work force at specific times; and to
purchase health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, or long-term care insurance.
Tax policy, for example, is used explicitly to influence home ownership (a specific form of savings) as well as
saving for retirement. Currently, the Department of Labor is mounting a public education campaign to
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encourage workers to save for their retirement. Tax policies also affect employer-provided benefit programs,
including pensions and post-retirement medical benefits. In addition, public policy affects the types of
insurance products offered in the private market. The availability of low-risk government bonds as well as
inflation-adjusted bonds reflect policy decisions directed at helping individuals save and institutions diversify
portfolios. And government-sponsored education loans encourage the pursuit of higher education.
POLICIES THAT AFFECT DEMOGRAPHY
Public policy can affect demography itself. China provides an extreme example, where each family is allowed, by
law, to have only one child. This policy will have a dramatic impact on the future size and age distribution of
the population in China. Less extreme policies can influence the future size and age distribution of the
population in the United States. These include policies that affect immigration, public health, individual health
behaviors, investments in scientific research for biomedical breakthroughs that directly affect mortality or
fertility rates, and policies that affect individual access to medical care. Tax policy can also be used to encourage
families to have children. Currently, for example, family income subject to federal income taxes is adjusted for
the number of children using both deductions and credits. Deductions for some child care expenses are also
allowed. Immigration policy can affect both the number and age distribution of people living in the country by
controlling how many and what types of people can enter.
Improvements in public health—including activities that ensure safe air and water, immunize the population,
and promote certain healthy behaviors—have increased life expectancy in the United States. Improvement in
life expectancy can also be traced to the dramatic reduction in infant mortality brought about by better diet,
prenatal care, and the medical technology to support perinatal care. Premature babies, whose survival would
have been considered a miracle ten years ago, routinely survive and thrive today.
Scientific and technological advances have also improved care later in life. More diseases can be diagnosed and
treated today than in the past. And many more people live with illnesses that would have been fatal earlier in
the century. Direct government-financed scientific research has contributed to advances in medical science.
Similarly, scientific breakthroughs have led to commercial applications, at least in part because of tax and patent
law policies that encourage corporate research and development. These policies, in conjunction with
government efforts to increase individual access to medical care, will almost certainly continue to improve the
life expectancy of older people in the future.
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THE CHALLENGE POSED BY FEDERAL ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS
While it is important to recognize that public policy can affect the future, it is also important to come to terms
with the fact that an aging and longer-living population may increase public and private costs. Much of the
concern over the anticipated growth in the elderly population is related to anxiety about federal entitlement
program spending. More elderly will result in more claims against Social Security and Medicare. More elderly
will probably also mean more claims on Medicaid for long-term care, unless there are dramatic changes in the
way long-term care is financed. Rising numbers of beneficiaries means more federal expenditures.
The federal budget is just one facet of the economy, however. As noted earlier, the economy is likely to grow
even as federal expenditures grow. With sufficient economic growth (2.8 percent a year as noted in Chapter
Three), projected federal, state, and local government spending will not be any larger as a percent of national
income than it is today. Lower economic growth will mean expenditures for government programs that account
for an increased share of national income, requiring tough choices in cutting benefits or raising taxes in order
to raise the needed revenues.
The challenge posed by federal entitlement programs is how the expected increase in entitlement expenditures
compares to the expected increase in the nation’s wealth. Any reasonable assumption about economic growth
suggests that the economy of 2030 will be substantially larger than the economy of 1999. Moreover, under most
assumptions this increase in the economy will be larger than the increase in expenditures. The public policy
question is how much of this economic growth should be distributed towards future beneficiaries.
In addition to evaluating the costs of programs like Medicare and Social Security, it is important to consider the
benefits these programs provide and what the alternatives would be if those benefits did not exist. For example,
while Social Security expenditures are large, the program provides the means for many elderly people to live
independently. Without it, or with a less generous program, more of the elderly would be forced to live with
their adult children. Younger workers may be willing to contribute more taxes to support federal programs if
they conclude that the only alternative is to have their parent and in-laws live with them. Similarly, they may be
willing to pay more to support Medicare coverage of health care products and services that enable their parents
to live more independently and enjoy a better quality of life. Regardless of what is decided about the
distribution of future economic growth, millions of people will need health care or long-term care. In fact,
everyone is at risk of needing such care, and the costs of care are extraordinarily large.
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The question of how to finance Social Security and Medicare is only one part of the broader discussion about
how best to insure risks. Regardless of how program-specific financing questions are resolved, families and
communities will still face a wide array of issues arising from the aging of society that will not be addressed by
entitlement reforms. Communities already face the challenges of educating a growing number of children to
meet the labor market needs of the future, while serving a growing number of social service needs. Employers
are beginning to face relative shortages of entry-level workers, especially very skilled workers, while continuing
to encourage older workers to retire. Older workers are having to balance financial incentives to leave the labor
force with concerns that they will not have sufficient resources to support their retirement (or that complete
retirement may leave a void in their lives). All individuals face tremendous uncertainty about whether they will
be healthy in later years and whether they will have the financial resources or insurance to pay for the care they
may need. Some families continue to struggle to arrange for nurturing, safe, and affordable childcare. Others
seek safe and appropriate long-term care. Still others must find both types of care. Issues related to housing,
transportation, and the economic vitality of the community are all affected by society’s aging.
MAKING RATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES
While demography will affect the future, society’s destiny is not determined solely by demographic changes. A
growing number of economists and demographers have begun to systematically evaluate the nearly simultaneous
relationship among demographic changes, the economy, and family formation. Individual responses culminate in
societal responses that can affect the labor market, the market for goods and services, living arrangements, and
public policy. The economy, public policy, and the adaptations individuals and institutions make will also affect
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HOW MUCH WILL THE ECONOMY HAVE TO GROW TO SUPPORT THE RETIREMENT OF
THE BABY-BOOM?
Between 1998 and 2030 the number of Social Security or Medicare beneficiaries is expected to double. Program
expenditures, according to the Congressional Budget Office, are expected to much more than double, increasing
nearly 167 percent (adjusted for inflation). Can society handle this increase in Medicare and Social Security
expenditures? If national income increases 167 percent or more, then the answer is clearly yes. National income
(adjusted for inflation) will increase 167 percent if real economic growth over the next 32 years averages 1.6 percent
per year. In the past 32 years real economic growth has averaged 2.9 percent per year. If society can afford these
programs today at prevailing growth rates there is little reason to suggest that society cannot afford them tomorrow.
If national income does not increase as much as 167 percent, the question of affordability is more complicated.
Policy makers will be forced to increase taxes, cut benefits, or reduce other government activities.
the future. Consequently, anticipating the future simply by focusing on the anticipated growth and changing age
distribution of the population in the future is much too simplistic to be useful.
Public policy can change expectations, and changing expectations can influence how people behave in the
various spheres in which they operate. Public policy can also provide the information and incentives for people,
communities, and institutions to invest in the future in ways that will support economic growth. And public
policy can help direct resources to those with the greatest need, and can insure risks that are not insurable in
the private market. Through deliberate and incremental actions, public policy can affect educational
attainment, family formation, labor force participation, and the demand for goods and services upon which
economic growth depends.
Much of what will occur in the future and how certain changes will affect the rest of society is not yet known.
This is not to suggest, however, that no action is warranted. Rather, it suggests that policy makers must decide
on policies today, but recognize at the same time that policies must change as everything else changes. Specific
programs will have to be adjusted over time as circumstances change. Anticipating the future and acting
accordingly will change the future itself.
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IS THERE A LIMIT ON FEDERAL TAXES?
Some have argued that the public will not tolerate federal expenditures in excess of 20 percent of national income.
Those who make this argument actually look at federal expenditures, which reflect taxes. They note that there
have been few times in which federal expenditures as a percent of national income exceeded 20 percent, and that
each time federal expenditures have quickly fallen back below 20 percent. The implication these observers draw is
that policy makers chose to cut federal expenditures because expenditures had reached a threshold the public
would not tolerate.
A closer look at the history and timing of tax law changes does not fully support this notion. Regardless of the
absolute or relative level of taxes or expenditures, there has always been political pressure to avoid raising taxes as
well as pressure to cut taxes. But, neither tax rates nor government spending were typically cut when government
expenditures exceeded 20 percent of national income.1 The proportion usually fell again because economic growth
increased national income faster than the government increased expenditures.
There may very well be a limit to the level of taxes the public will tolerate, but it is not clear that 20 percent is that
limit. Data from thirty years ago, for example, could have been used to support the claim that federal expenditures
could not rise above 15 percent of national income, which is clearly false. Perhaps the question for the public has
more to do with what government is doing with the taxes, than the relative size of government. After all, we are
the government, the employers, and the taxpayers. But over a lifetime, we are also the children, the parents, and
finally the seniors in families and communities.
1 Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform. (1994). Interim Report to the President. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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Figure 2-2: Life Expectancy for Men and Women
at Age 65
Men Women
(Years of Life) (Years of Life)
1940 11.9 13.4
1945 12.6 14.4
1950 12.8 15.1
1955 13.1 15.6
1960 12.9 15.9
1965 12.9 16.3
1970 13.1 17.1
1975 13.7 18.0
1976 13.7 18.1
1977 13.9 18.3
1978 13.9 18.3
1979 14.2 18.6
1980 14.0 18.4
1981 14.2 18.6
1982 14.5 18.8
1983 14.3 18.6
1984 14.4 18.7
1985 14.4 18.6
1986 14.5 18.7
1987 14.6 18.7
1988 14.6 18.7
1989 14.8 18.9
1990 15.0 19.0
1991 15.1 19.1
1992 15.2 19.2
1993 15.1 19.0
1994 15.3 19.0
1995 15.6 19.0
1996 15.5 19.2
Source: The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability
Insurance Trust Funds. (April 1997). The 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Washington
DC: Table II.D2.
Note: The life expectancy for any year is the average number of years of life remaining for a
person if that person were to experience the death rates by age observed in, or assumed for,
the selected year.
Figure 2-3: Number of Live Births
Number of Number of
Live Births Live Births
(In Thousands) (In Thousands)
1945 2,858 1971 3,556
1946 3,411 1972 3,258
1947 3,817 1973 3,137
1948 3,637 1974 3,160
1949 3,649 1975 3,144
1950 3,632 1976 3,168
1951 3,823 1977 3,327
1952 3,913 1978 3,333
1953 3,965 1979 3,494
1954 4,078 1980 3,612
1955 4,104 1981 3,629
1956 4,218 1982 3,681
1957 4,308 1983 3,639
1958 4,255 1984 3,669
1959 4,245 1985 3,761
1960 4,258 1986 3,757
1961 4,268 1987 3,809
1962 4,167 1988 3,910
1963 4,098 1989 4,041
1964 4,027 1990 4,158
1965 3,760 1991 4,111
1966 3,606 1992 4,065
1967 3,521 1993 4,000
1968 3,502 1994 3,853
1969 3,600 1995 3,900
1970 3,731 1996 3,915
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970,
Series B-14, 1975.
National Center for Health Statistics, Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 45, No. 11 (S).
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Detailed Tables of Time-Series Figures
The following tables provide the data for all of the time-series figures presented in the report. For easy reference
the figure numbers and titles in this section reflect those of the figures in the report.
Figure 2-4: Population Pyramids, 1950 to 2030 (Number in Thousands)
1950 1998 2030
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age
Under 5 8,362 8,048 9,780 9,336 11,813 11,253
5 to 9 6,811 6,564 10,252 9,773 11,730 11,159
10 to 14 5,707 5,506 9,920 9,451 11,979 11,398
15 to 19 5,381 5,294 9,955 9,470 12,064 11,472
20 to 24 5,794 5,886 8,853 8,598 11,363 11,038
25 to 29 6,071 6,291 9,279 9,289 10,567 10,623
30 to 34 5,733 5,942 10,046 10,143 10,648 10,906
35 to 39 5,585 5,762 11,246 11,333 11,047 11,349
40 to 44 5,121 5,169 10,798 11,013 10,728 11,139
45 to 49 4,566 4,576 9,225 9,588 9,905 10,446
50 to 54 4,149 4,162 7,635 8,071 8,949 9,597
55 to 59 3,656 3,637 5,957 6,443 8,568 9,284
60 to 64 3,058 3,045 4,847 5,413 8,873 9,623
65 to 69 2,447 2,602 4,378 5,194 9,387 10,246
70 to 74 1,644 1,800 3,846 4,947 8,491 9,283
75 to 79 1,005 1,150 2,983 4,221 6,561 7,401
80 to 84 518 642 1,747 2,973 4,257 5,298
85 + 243 347 1,134 2,862 3,021 5,433
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Series A119-134, 1975.
U.S. Census Bureau. Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, Sex, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050. P25-1130, Table 2, 1996.
Figure 2-7: Population by Age: Alternative Census Bureau Projections (Number in Thousands)
Total Population Total Non-Elderly Total Population Total Non-Elderly 
(Low) Population (Low) (High) Population (High)
2000 271,237 236,953 278,129 242,964
2010 281,468 244,306 314,571 272,893
2020 288,807 241,004 357,702 299,302
2030 291,070 232,201 405,089 325,760
2040 287,685 229,231 458,444 366,521
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, Sex, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, P25-1130, Table F, 1996.
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Figure 2-8: Projections Change over Time
1981 Projections Actual Rates 1997 Projections
(Number of Births Per (Number of Births Per (Number of Births Per
Woman Age 15 to 44) Woman Age 15 to 44) Woman Age 15 to 44)
1980 1.85 1.85
1985 1.89 1.84
1990 1.95 2.07
1995 2.00 2.02
2000 2.05 2.00
2010 2.10 1.95
2020 2.10 1.90
2030 2.10 1.90
2040 2.10 1.90
Source: The 1981 and 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds.
Figure 2-9: Past and Projected Population Age 65 and Older 
Historical Lowest Series Middle Series Highest Series
(Number in (Number in (Number in (Number in
Thousands) Thousands) Thousands) Thousands)
1960 16,560
1970 19,980
1980 25,550
1990 31,079
2000 34,284 34,709 35,165
2010 37,162 39,408 41,678
2020 47,803 53,220 58,400
2030 58,869 69,379 79,329
2040 58,454 75,233 91,923
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 65+ in the United States. P23–190, Table 2-1, 1996.
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, Sex, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, P25-1130, Table F, 1996.
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Figure 2-10: Past and Projected Population Age 85 and Older
Historical Lowest Series Middle Series Highest Series
(Number in (Number in (Number in (Number in
Thousands) Thousands) Thousands) Thousands)
1960 929
1970 1,409
1980 2,240
1990 3,021
2000 4,148 4,259 4,399
2010 5,005 5,671 6,518
2020 4,987 6,460 8,456
2030 5,776 8,455 12,198
2040 8,250 13,552 20,920
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 65+ in the United States. P23–190, Table 2-1, 1996.
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, Sex, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, P25-1130, Table F, 1996.
Figure 2-11: Number of Elderly per 100 Workers Age 20 to 64:Three Projections
Low Cost Intermediate Cost High Cost
2000 20.9 21.1 21.2
2010 20.6 21.4 22.2
2020 25.8 27.5 29.0
2030 32.3 35.5 38.9
2040 31.9 36.9 42.6
Source: 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table II.H1.
Note: These three projections are based on values relating to future trends in certain key factors that affect the balance in the Social Security Trust Funds. The “low cost” set assumes relatively
rapid economic growth, low inflation, and favorable demographic conditions. The “intermediate” set of assumptions represents the Social Security Trustees “best estimates” of likely future
economic and demographic conditions. The “high cost” set assumes slow economic growth, more rapid inflation, and financially disadvantageous demographic conditions.
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Figure 3-1: Real GDP from 1929 to 1997
Real GDP Real GDP
(Billions of (Billions of 
1992 Dollars) 1992 Dollars)
1929 $790.9 1964 $2,708.4
1930 719.7 1965 2,881.1
1931 674.0 1966 3,069.2
1932 584.3 1967 3,147.2
1933 577.3 1968 3,293.9
1934 641.1 1969 3,393.6
1935 698.4 1970 3,397.6
1936 790.0 1971 3,510.0
1937 831.5 1972 3,702.3
1938 801.2 1973 3,916.3
1939 866.5 1974 3,891.2
1940 941.2 1975 3,873.9
1941 1,101.8 1976 4,082.9
1942 1,308.9 1977 4,273.6
1943 1,523.0 1978 4,503.0
1944 1,644.7 1979 4,630.6
1945 1,626.7 1980 4,615.0
1946 1,447.7 1981 4,720.7
1947 1,430.7 1982 4,620.3
1948 1,491.0 1983 4,803.7
1949 1,479.8 1984 5,140.1
1950 1,611.3 1985 5,323.5
1951 1,734.0 1986 5,487.7
1952 1,798.7 1987 5,649.5
1953 1,881.4 1988 5,865.2
1954 1,868.2 1989 6,062.0
1955 2,001.1 1990 6,136.3
1956 2,040.2 1991 6,079.4
1957 2,078.5 1992 6,244.4
1958 2,057.5 1993 6,389.6
1959 2,210.2 1994 6,610.7
1960 2,262.9 1995 6,761.7
1961 2,314.3 1996 6,994.8
1962 2,454.8 1997 7,269.8
1963 2,559.4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Product Accounts, October 1998.
Figure 3-2: GDP Per Capita
GDP Per Capita GDP Per Capita
(1992 Dollars) (1992 Dollars)
1929 $6,495.19 1964 $14,114.41
1930 5,847.56 1965 14,827.87
1931 5,433.73 1966 15,614.57
1932 4,680.39 1967 15,838.00
1933 4,597.11 1968 16,411.57
1934 5,073.04 1969 16,743.88
1935 5,488.41 1970 16,569.46
1936 6,169.32 1971 16,902.55
1937 6,454.49 1972 17,638.74
1938 6,171.38 1973 18,481.05
1939 6,620.57 1974 18,195.59
1940 7,123.72 1975 17,936.96
1941 8,259.25 1976 18,725.89
1942 9,705.62 1977 19,404.37
1943 11,138.01 1978 20,230.47
1944 11,883.93 1979 20,575.41
1945 11,625.26 1980 20,310.27
1946 10,239.13 1981 20,572.55
1947 9,926.73 1982 19,943.97
1948 10,168.38 1983 20,546.90
1949 9,919.03 1984 21,796.25
1950 10,581.79 1985 22,374.79
1951 11,195.91 1986 22,852.75
1952 11,416.48 1987 23,317.20
1953 11,745.24 1988 23,988.65
1954 11,459.52 1989 24,560.51
1955 12,059.83 1990 24,600.30
1956 12,079.12 1991 24,112.74
1957 12,085.43 1992 24,487.65
1958 11,765.08 1993 24,789.62
1959 12,428.72 1994 25,397.25
1960 12,524.98 1995 25,733.27
1961 12,598.88 1996 26,377.65
1962 13,159.79 1997 27,163.01
1963 13,524.48
Source: www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt, October 1998.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Product Accounts, October 1998.
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Figure 3-3: Past and Projected Real GDP
Past Real GDP Projected Real GDP
(Billions of 1992 Dollars) (Billions of 1992 Dollars)
Assuming Real Assuming Real 
Growth of 1 Percent Growth of  3 Percent
1950 $1,611.3 1998 $7,342.5 $7,487.9
1951 1,734.0 1999 7,415.9 7,712.5
1952 1,798.7 2000 7,490.1 7,943.9
1953 1,881.4 2001 7,565.0 8,182.2
1954 1,868.2 2002 7,640.6 8,427.7
1955 2,001.1 2003 7,717.0 8,680.5
1956 2,040.2 2004 7,794.2 8,940.9
1957 2,078.5 2005 7,872.2 9,209.2
1958 2,057.5 2006 7,950.9 9,485.4
1959 2,210.2 2007 8,030.4 9,770.0
1960 2,262.9 2008 8,110.7 10,063.1
1961 2,314.3 2009 8,191.8 10,365.0
1962 2,454.8 2010 8,273.7 10,676.0
1963 2,559.4 2011 8,356.4 10,996.2
1964 2,708.4 2012 8,440.0 11,326.1
1965 2,881.1 2013 8,524.4 11,665.9
1966 3,069.2 2014 8,609.7 12,015.9
1967 3,147.2 2015 8,695.8 12,376.4
1968 3,293.9 2016 8,782.7 12,747.6
1969 3,393.6 2017 8,870.5 13,130.1
1970 3,397.6 2018 8,959.2 13,524.0
1971 3,510.0 2019 9,048.8 13,929.7
1972 3,702.3 2020 9,139.3 14,347.6
1973 3,916.3 2021 9,230.7 14,778.0
1974 3,891.2 2022 9,323.0 15,221.4
1975 3,873.9 2023 9,416.3 15,678.0
1976 4,082.9 2024 9,510.4 16,148.3
1977 4,273.6 2025 9,605.5 16,632.8
1978 4,503.0 2026 9,701.6 17,131.8
1979 4,630.6 2027 9,798.6 17,645.7
1980 4,615.0 2028 9,896.6 18,175.1
1981 4,720.7 2029 9,995.5 18,720.3
1982 4,620.3 2030 10,095.5 19,282.0
1983 4,803.7
1984 5,140.1
1985 5,323.5
1986 5,487.7
1987 5,649.5
1988 5,865.2
1989 6,062.0
1990 6,136.3
1991 6,079.4
1992 6,244.4
1993 6,389.6
1994 6,610.7
1995 6,761.7
1996 6,994.8
1997 7,269.8
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Product Accounts, October 1998 and NAAS calculations.
68 NATIONAL ACADEMY ON AN AGING SOCIETY
Figure 3-4: Federal, State, and Local Government Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
State and Local Government Federal Government Total Government 
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
1950 7.0 8.9 16.0
1951 6.8 13.3 20.1
1952 6.8 16.6 23.4
1953 6.9 17.0 23.9
1954 7.6 15.1 22.7
1955 7.6 13.2 20.9
1956 7.9 12.9 20.9
1957 8.4 13.3 21.6
1958 9.1 13.7 22.7
1959 8.8 13.2 22.1
1960 9.0 12.5 21.5
1961 9.5 12.7 22.2
1962 9.4 13.1 22.5
1963 9.7 12.6 22.3
1964 9.5 11.6 21.1
1965 9.9 11.4 21.3
1966 10.1 11.9 22.0
1967 10.6 12.8 23.4
1968 10.8 12.5 23.3
1969 11.0 11.8 22.8
1970 11.6 11.2 22.8
1971 11.8 10.4 22.2
1972 11.6 10.1 21.7
1973 11.5 9.3 20.8
1974 12.2 9.3 21.6
1975 12.8 9.5 22.2
1976 12.3 8.9 21.2
1977 11.8 8.8 20.6
1978 11.5 8.5 20.0
1979 11.4 8.4 19.8
1980 11.7 8.9 20.6
1981 11.2 9.1 20.3
1982 11.5 9.7 21.1
1983 11.1 9.8 20.9
1984 10.9 9.5 20.4
1985 11.1 9.8 20.9
1986 11.4 9.8 21.2
1987 11.4 9.7 21.2
1988 11.4 9.1 20.4
1989 11.4 8.8 20.1
1990 11.7 8.8 20.5
1991 11.9 8.8 20.7
1992 11.8 8.5 20.2
1993 11.7 7.9 19.6
1994 11.6 7.3 18.9
1995 11.6 7.0 18.7
1996 11.6 6.8 18.4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, August 1997.
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Figure 3-5: State and Local Government Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditures
State and Local Government Expenditures State and Local Government Expenditures
(Percent of Total Expenditures) (Percent of Total Expenditures)
1960 31.6 1979 38.3
1961 32.1 1980 36.5
1962 31.7 1981 35.1
1963 32.3 1982 33.9
1964 33.3 1983 33.3
1965 33.9 1984 33.4
1966 33.7 1985 33.4
1967 33.3 1986 34.1
1968 33.9 1987 34.7
1969 35.5 1988 35.1
1970 36.9 1989 35.3
1971 38.3 1990 36.0
1972 38.9 1991 37.3
1973 39.3 1992 36.7
1974 38.8 1993 37.6
1975 38.5 1994 38.5
1976 39.1 1995 38.6
1977 39.2 1996 38.8
1978 39.0 1997 39.1
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, February 1998, Table B-83.
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Figure 3-6: Federal Expenditures, 1962 to 1998
Social Medicare Medicaid Other Defense Other Net Total
Security Mandatory Discretionary Interest
Programs Programs
1962 $14.0 $0.0 $0.1 $20.6 $52.6 $19.5 $6.9 $106.8
1963 15.5 0.0 0.2 20.5 53.7 21.5 7.7 111.3
1964 16.2 0.0 0.2 22.5 55.0 24.1 8.2 118.5
1965 17.1 0.0 0.3 22.3 51.0 26.8 8.6 118.2
1966 20.3 0.5 0.8 21.8 59.0 31.2 9.4 134.5
1967 21.3 3.2 1.2 25.2 72.0 34.4 10.3 157.5
1968 23.3 5.1 1.8 29.5 82.2 35.8 11.1 178.1
1969 26.7 6.3 2.3 29.4 82.7 34.6 12.7 183.6
1970 29.6 6.8 2.7 33.5 81.9 38.3 14.4 195.6
1971 35.1 7.5 3.4 40.9 79.0 43.5 14.8 210.2
1972 39.4 8.4 4.6 48.5 79.3 49.1 15.5 230.7
1973 48.2 9.0 4.6 54.3 77.1 53.1 17.3 245.7
1974 55.0 10.7 5.8 59.5 80.7 57.3 21.4 269.4
1975 63.6 14.1 6.8 85.1 87.6 70.2 23.2 332.2
1976 72.7 16.9 8.6 91.2 89.9 85.4 26.7 371.8
1977 83.7 20.8 9.9 89.6 97.5 99.3 29.9 409.2
1978 92.4 24.3 10.7 100.3 104.6 113.8 35.5 458.7
1979 102.6 28.2 12.4 104.1 116.8 122.9 42.6 504.0
1980 117.1 34.0 14.0 126.4 134.6 141.5 52.5 590.9
1981 137.9 41.3 16.8 143.6 158.0 149.7 68.8 678.2
1982 153.9 49.2 17.4 150.4 185.9 139.9 85.0 745.8
1983 168.5 55.5 19.0 167.7 209.9 143.3 89.8 808.4
1984 176.1 61.0 20.1 148.6 228.0 151.2 111.1 851.9
1985 186.4 69.6 22.7 169.7 253.1 162.6 129.5 946.4
1986 196.5 74.2 25.0 166.3 273.8 164.5 136.0 990.5
1987 205.1 79.9 27.4 162.0 282.5 161.4 138.7 1,004.1
1988 216.8 85.7 30.5 172.3 290.9 173.2 151.8 1,064.5
1989 230.4 94.3 34.6 190.3 304.0 184.5 169.3 1,143.7
1990 246.5 107.4 41.1 232.3 300.1 200.2 184.2 1,253.2
1991 266.8 114.2 52.5 269.1 319.7 213.3 194.5 1,324.4
1992 285.2 129.4 67.8 234.2 302.6 231.5 199.4 1,381.7
1993 302.0 143.1 75.8 215.9 292.4 248.0 198.8 1,409.4
1994 316.9 159.5 82.0 225.6 282.3 261.0 203.0 1,461.7
1995 333.3 177.1 89.1 218.7 273.6 271.5 232.2 1,515.7
1996 347.1 191.3 92.0 227.2 266 267.8 241.1 1,560.5
1997 362.3 207.9 95.6 228.8 271.9 276.7 244.1 1,600.9
1998 376.0 214.0 101.0 251.0 270.0 282.0 244.0 1,738.0
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1999-2008, Tables E-8, E-10, E-12.
Note: All figures in billions of dollars.
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Figure 3-9: Government Expenditures as a
Percentage of GDP through 2030, Using Two
Assumptions of Economic Growth
Projected Total Government Expenditures as a
Percent of GDP (Real 1992 Dollars)
Assuming Anemic Assuming Robust
Economic Growth Economic Growth
(1 percent) (3 percent)
1997 34.1 34.1
1998 34.7 34.1
1999 35.4 34.0
2000 36.0 33.9
2001 36.6 33.9
2002 37.3 33.8
2003 38.0 33.8
2004 38.6 33.7
2005 39.3 33.6
2006 40.0 33.6
2007 40.8 33.5
2008 41.5 33.4
2009 42.2 33.4
2010 43.0 33.3
2011 43.8 33.3
2012 44.5 33.2
2013 45.3 33.1
2014 46.2 33.1
2015 47.0 33.0
2016 47.8 32.9
2017 48.7 32.9
2018 49.6 32.8
2019 50.4 32.8
2020 51.3 32.7
2021 52.3 32.6
2022 53.2 32.6
2023 54.2 32.5
2024 55.1 32.5
2025 56.1 32.4
2026 57.1 32.4
2027 58.2 32.3
2028 59.2 32.2
2029 60.3 32.2
2030 61.3 32.1
Source: National Academy on an Aging Society calculations based on CBO projections for 2030.
Figure 4-1: Median Income of Elderly Families 
(In 1996 Dollars)
Median Income
1962 $8,414
1967 8,587
1971 11,897
1976 12,960
1978 13,548
1980 13,272
1982 14,292
1984 15,358
1986 15,690
1988 16,145
1990 16,205
1992 15,611
1994 15,980
1996 16,099
Source: Grad, S. (May 1998). Income of the Aged Chartbook, 1996.
Figure 4-2: Percent of Elderly with Income Sources
Social Asset Pensions Earnings Public 
Security Income Assistance
1962 69 54 18 36 14
1967 86 50 22 27 12
1971 87 49 23 31 10
1976 89 56 31 25 11
1978 90 62 32 25 10
1980 90 66 34 23 10
1982 90 68 35 22 8
1984 91 68 38 21 9
1986 91 67 40 20 7
1988 92 68 42 22 7
1990 92 69 44 22 7
1992 92 67 45 20 7
1994 91 67 42 21 6
1996 91 63 41 21 6
Source: Grad, S. (May 1998). Income of the Aged Chartbook, 1996.
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Figure 4-3: Poverty Rate by Age
Less than Age 18 Age 65
Age 18 to 64 or Older
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
1959 27.3 17.0 35.2
1966 17.6 10.5 28.5
1967 16.6 10.0 29.5
1968 15.6 9.0 25.0
1969 14.0 8.7 25.3
1970 15.1 9.0 24.6
1971 15.3 9.3 21.5
1972 15.1 8.8 18.6
1973 14.4 8.3 16.3
1974 15.4 8.3 14.6
1975 17.1 9.2 15.3
1976 16.0 9.0 15.0
1977 16.2 8.8 14.1
1978 15.9 8.7 14.0
1979 16.4 8.9 15.2
1980 18.3 10.1 15.7
1981 20.0 11.1 15.3
1982 21.9 12.0 14.6
1983 22.3 12.4 13.8
1984 21.5 11.7 12.4
1985 20.7 11.3 12.6
1986 20.5 10.8 12.4
1987 20.3 10.6 12.5
1988 19.5 10.5 12.0
1989 19.6 10.2 11.4
1990 20.6 10.7 12.2
1991 21.8 11.4 12.4
1992 22.3 11.9 12.9
1993 22.7 12.4 12.2
1994 21.8 11.9 11.7
1995 20.8 11.4 10.5
1996 20.5 11.4 10.8
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Appendix Tables C1 and C2, 1997.
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the United States. P60-198, 1998.
Note: Data from 1960 through 1966 are unavailable.
Figure 4-5: Disability Rates of the Elderly,
by Gender
Male Female
(Percent) (Percent)
1970 45.8 39.6
1971 47.2 41.2
1972 47.0 40.5
1973 46.3 42.6
1974 49.7 43.1
1975 49.9 44.4
1976 48.3 43.4
1977 47.7 39.7
1978 48.2 42.7
1979 49.1 43.9
1980 48.8 42.7
1981 49.6 43.1
1983* 39.3 40.7
1984 39.0 39.0
1985 39.1 39.9
1986 37.2 40.0
1987 37.0 37.9
1988 36.3 37.4
1989 38.6 38.0
1990 35.7 38.8
1991 37.2 38.4
1992 38.4 39.1
1993 38.1 39.5
1994 38.1 38.2
Source: Kaye, H., LaPlante, M., Carlson, D., and Wenger, B., Trends in Disability Rates in the
United States, 1970-1994, Disability Statistics Abstract, Number 17, November 1996, Figure 2.
Note: Data for 1982 are unavailable.
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Figure 4-6: Labor Force Participation Rates for
Women, by Age
Age Age Age Age Age 
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-69
1960 36.0 43.4 49.9 37.2 17.6
1961 36.4 43.8 50.1 37.9 17.8
1962 36.3 44.1 50.0 38.7 16.9
1963 37.2 44.9 50.6 39.7 16.5
1964 37.2 45.0 51.4 40.2 17.5
1965 38.5 46.1 50.9 41.1 17.4
1966 39.8 46.8 51.7 41.8 17.0
1967 41.9 48.1 51.8 42.4 17.0
1968 42.6 48.9 52.3 42.4 17.0
1969 43.7 49.9 53.8 43.1 17.3
1970 45.0 51.1 54.4 43.0 17.3
1971 45.6 51.6 54.3 42.9 17.0
1972 47.8 52.0 53.9 42.1 17.0
1973 50.4 53.3 53.7 41.1 16.0
1974 52.6 54.7 54.6 40.7 14.4
1975 54.9 55.8 54.6 40.9 14.5
1976 57.3 57.8 55.0 41.0 14.9
1977 59.7 59.6 55.8 40.9 14.5
1978 62.2 61.6 57.1 41.3 14.9
1979 63.9 63.6 58.3 41.7 15.3
1980 65.5 65.5 59.9 41.3 15.1
1981 66.7 66.8 61.1 41.4 14.9
1982 68.0 68.0 61.6 41.8 14.9
1983 69.0 68.7 61.9 41.5 14.7
1984 69.8 70.1 62.9 41.7 14.2
1985 70.9 71.8 64.4 42.0 13.5
1986 71.6 73.1 65.9 42.3 14.3
1987 72.4 74.5 67.1 42.7 14.3
1988 72.7 75.2 69.0 43.5 15.4
1989 73.5 76.0 70.5 45.0 16.4
1990 73.5 76.4 71.2 45.2 17.0
1991 73.1 76.5 72.0 45.2 17.0
1992 73.9 76.7 72.6 46.5 16.2
1993 73.4 76.6 73.5 47.2 16.1
1994 74.0 77.1 74.6 48.9 17.9
1995 74.9 77.2 74.4 49.2 17.5
1996 75.2 77.5 75.4 49.6 17.2
1997 76.0 77.7 76.0 50.9 17.6
Source: Quinn, J. Retirement Patterns and Bridge Jobs in the 1990s.
Figure 4-7: Labor Force Participation Rates for
Men, by Age
Age Age Age Age Age 
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-69
1960 97.5 97.7 95.7 86.8 46.8
1961 97.5 97.6 95.6 87.3 44.1
1962 97.2 97.6 95.6 86.2 42.8
1963 97.1 97.5 95.7 86.2 40.9
1964 97.3 97.3 95.7 85.6 42.6
1965 97.2 97.3 95.6 84.6 43.0
1966 97.3 97.2 95.3 84.5 42.7
1967 97.2 97.3 95.2 84.4 43.4
1968 96.9 97.1 94.9 84.3 43.0
1969 96.7 96.9 94.6 83.4 42.3
1970 96.4 96.9 94.3 83.0 41.6
1971 95.9 96.5 93.9 82.1 39.4
1972 95.7 96.4 93.2 80.4 36.9
1973 95.7 96.2 93.0 78.2 34.2
1974 95.8 96.0 92.2 77.3 32.9
1975 95.2 95.6 92.1 75.6 31.7
1976 95.2 95.4 91.6 74.3 29.3
1977 95.3 95.7 91.1 73.8 29.4
1978 95.3 95.7 91.3 73.3 30.1
1979 95.3 95.7 91.4 72.8 29.6
1980 95.2 95.5 91.2 72.1 28.5
1981 94.9 95.4 91.4 70.6 27.8
1982 94.7 95.3 91.2 70.2 26.9
1983 94.2 95.2 91.2 69.4 26.1
1984 94.4 95.4 91.2 68.5 24.6
1985 94.7 95.0 91.0 67.9 24.4
1986 94.6 94.8 91.0 67.3 25.0
1987 94.6 94.6 90.7 67.6 26.8
1988 94.3 94.5 90.9 67.0 25.8
1989 94.4 94.5 91.1 67.2 26.1
1990 94.1 94.3 90.7 67.8 26.0
1991 93.6 94.1 90.5 67.0 25.1
1992 93.8 93.7 90.7 67.0 25.9
1993 93.4 93.4 90.1 66.5 25.4
1994 92.6 92.8 89.1 65.5 26.8
1995 93.0 92.3 88.8 66.0 27.0
1996 93.2 92.4 89.1 67.0 27.5
1997 93.0 92.6 89.5 67.6 28.4
Source: Quinn, J. Retirement Patterns and Bridge Jobs in the 1990s.
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Figure 4-14: Poverty Rates of the Elderly by Race, 1959 to 1994
White Black Hispanic
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
1959 33.1 62.5
1966 26.4 55.1
1967 27.7 53.3
1968 23.1 47.7
1969 23.3 50.2
1970 22.6 48.0
1971 19.9 39.3
1972 16.8 39.9
1973 14.4 37.1 24.9
1974 12.8 34.3 28.9
1975 13.4 36.3 32.6
1976 13.2 34.8 27.7
1977 11.9 36.3 21.9
1978 12.1 33.9 23.2
1979 13.3 36.2 26.8
1980 13.6 38.1 30.8
1981 13.1 39.0 25.7
1982 12.4 38.2 26.6
1983 11.7 36.0 22.1
1984 10.7 31.7 21.5
1985 11.0 31.5 23.9
1986 10.7 31.0 22.5
1987 10.6 32.4 27.5
1988 10.0 32.2 22.4
1989 9.6 30.7 20.6
1990 10.1 33.8 22.5
1991 10.3 33.8 20.8
1992 11.0 33.5 22.1
1993 10.7 28 21.4
1994 10.2 27.4 22.6
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Valuation of Noncash Benefits, 1994, Table B-6.
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